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Message-Id: <1250690853.8282.59.camel@twins>
Date: Wed, 19 Aug 2009 16:07:33 +0200
From: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@...llo.nl>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@...ba.org>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...hat.com>,
Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@...il.com>,
Mike Galbraith <efault@....de>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@...cle.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/4] perf_counter: Default to higher paranoia level
On Wed, 2009-08-19 at 11:18 +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> +static inline bool perf_paranoid_anon(void)
> +{
> + return !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && sysctl_perf_counter_paranoid > 1;
> }
>
> static inline bool perf_paranoid_kernel(void)
> {
> - return sysctl_perf_counter_paranoid > 1;
> + return !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && sysctl_perf_counter_paranoid > 2;
> +}
OK, this is buggy:
- capable() uses current, which is unlikely to be counter->owner,
- but even security_real_capable(counter->owner, ...) wouldn't
work, since the ->capable() callback isn't NMI safe
(selinux takes locks and does allocations in that path).
This puts a severe strain on more complex anonymizers since its
basically impossible to tell if counter->owner has permissions on
current from NMI context.
I'll fix up this patch to pre-compute the perf_paranoid_anon_ip() per
counter based on creation time state, unless somebody has a better idea.
I could possibly only anonymize IRQ context (SoftIRQ context is
difficult since in_softirq() means both in-softirq and
softirq-disabled).
--
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