2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know. ------------------ From: Linus Torvalds commit 0083fc2c50e6c5127c2802ad323adf8143ab7856 upstream. Ulrich Drepper correctly points out that there is generally padding in the structure on 64-bit hosts, and that copying the structure from kernel to user space can leak information from the kernel stack in those padding bytes. Avoid the whole issue by just copying the three members one by one instead, which also means that the function also can avoid the need for a stack frame. This also happens to match how we copy the new structure from user space, so it all even makes sense. [ The obvious solution of adding a memset() generates horrid code, gcc does really stupid things. ] Reported-by: Ulrich Drepper Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- kernel/signal.c | 15 ++++++++------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) --- a/kernel/signal.c +++ b/kernel/signal.c @@ -2414,11 +2414,9 @@ do_sigaltstack (const stack_t __user *us stack_t oss; int error; - if (uoss) { - oss.ss_sp = (void __user *) current->sas_ss_sp; - oss.ss_size = current->sas_ss_size; - oss.ss_flags = sas_ss_flags(sp); - } + oss.ss_sp = (void __user *) current->sas_ss_sp; + oss.ss_size = current->sas_ss_size; + oss.ss_flags = sas_ss_flags(sp); if (uss) { void __user *ss_sp; @@ -2461,13 +2459,16 @@ do_sigaltstack (const stack_t __user *us current->sas_ss_size = ss_size; } + error = 0; if (uoss) { error = -EFAULT; - if (copy_to_user(uoss, &oss, sizeof(oss))) + if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, uoss, sizeof(*uoss))) goto out; + error = __put_user(oss.ss_sp, &uoss->ss_sp) | + __put_user(oss.ss_size, &uoss->ss_size) | + __put_user(oss.ss_flags, &uoss->ss_flags); } - error = 0; out: return error; } -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/