linux-kernel - Re: [PATCHv5 3/3] vhost_net: a kernel-level virtio server

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Message-ID: <4AAE9967.9060406@gmail.com>
Date:	Mon, 14 Sep 2009 15:28:39 -0400
From:	Gregory Haskins <gregory.haskins@...il.com>
To:	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@...hat.com>
CC:	"Ira W. Snyder" <iws@...o.caltech.edu>, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
	virtualization@...ts.linux-foundation.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, mingo@...e.hu, linux-mm@...ck.org,
	akpm@...ux-foundation.org, hpa@...or.com,
	Rusty Russell <rusty@...tcorp.com.au>, s.hetze@...ux-ag.com
Subject: Re: [PATCHv5 3/3] vhost_net: a kernel-level virtio server

Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> On Mon, Sep 14, 2009 at 12:08:55PM -0400, Gregory Haskins wrote:
>> Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
>>> On Fri, Sep 11, 2009 at 12:00:21PM -0400, Gregory Haskins wrote:
>>>> FWIW: VBUS handles this situation via the "memctx" abstraction.  IOW,
>>>> the memory is not assumed to be a userspace address.  Rather, it is a
>>>> memctx-specific address, which can be userspace, or any other type
>>>> (including hardware, dma-engine, etc).  As long as the memctx knows how
>>>> to translate it, it will work.
>>> How would permissions be handled?
>> Same as anything else, really.  Read on for details.
>>
>>> it's easy to allow an app to pass in virtual addresses in its own address space.
>> Agreed, and this is what I do.
>>
>> The guest always passes its own physical addresses (using things like
>> __pa() in linux).  This address passed is memctx specific, but generally
>> would fall into the category of "virtual-addresses" from the hosts
>> perspective.
>>
>> For a KVM/AlacrityVM guest example, the addresses are GPAs, accessed
>> internally to the context via a gfn_to_hva conversion (you can see this
>> occuring in the citation links I sent)
>>
>> For Ira's example, the addresses would represent a physical address on
>> the PCI boards, and would follow any kind of relevant rules for
>> converting a "GPA" to a host accessible address (even if indirectly, via
>> a dma controller).
> 
> So vbus can let an application

"application" means KVM guest, or ppc board, right?

> access either its own virtual memory or a physical memory on a PCI device.

To reiterate from the last reply: the model is the "guest" owns the
memory.  The host is granted access to that memory by means of a memctx
object, which must be admitted to the host kernel and accessed according
 to standard access-policy mechanisms.  Generally the "application" or
guest would never be accessing anything other than its own memory.

> My question is, is any application
> that's allowed to do the former also granted rights to do the later?

If I understand your question, no.  Can you elaborate?

Kind Regards,
-Greg


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