linux-kernel - Re: [RFC] Privilege dropping security module

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Date:	Sat, 26 Sep 2009 21:09:58 +0000
From:	Andy Spencer <andy753421@...il.com>
To:	David Wagner <daw-news@...berkeley.edu>
Cc:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC] Privilege dropping security module

> As a result, in practice this interface to dpriv probably means that
> most implemented policies will be more permissive than
> intended/desired.  I consider that a defect in the design of the
> specification language.  It seems like it would be preferable to have
> a specification language that better facilitates secure use of dpriv.

What would you suggest as a better specification language? Would it be
sufficient to have recursive and non recursive variants for masking
permissions?

There's an implementation problem with using recursive permissions and
expanding * in userspace as well. If the user allows access to `foo' and
denies access to `foo/*', and later creates new entry of `foo/bar', the
new entry would have access allowed, which would probably not reflect
the users intent.

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