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Message-ID: <ada4oqgp5qx.fsf@cisco.com>
Date: Sat, 03 Oct 2009 13:44:22 -0700
From: Roland Dreier <rdreier@...co.com>
To: Henrique de Moraes Holschuh <hmh@....eng.br>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>, "Wang\, Shane" <shane.wang@...el.com>,
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...radead.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@...k.pl>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
"Cihula\, Joseph" <joseph.cihula@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] x86/txt for v2.6.32
> > > So I modify the RAM content so that BIOS does not think measured
> > > environment existed before suspend?
> And it is ridiculously easy to pull off, too:
> http://www.engadget.com/2008/02/21/cold-boot-disk-encryption-attack-is-shockingly-effective/
>
> Shows the attack being used to read sensitive keys, but you can use it also
> to *modify* system running state (it will be more difficult, as you need to
> remove and replace the RAM while on S3 instead of S5, but it should be
> doable by someone who knows what he is doing).
I believe the whole point of this TXT / S3 handling is that the resume
from S3 will then be able to detect that the contents of RAM have been
modified while the system was asleep.
TXT simply produces a reasonably trustworthy measurement of system
state. If you modify RAM while the system is asleep, then you will not
be able to produce a measurement showing an unmodified system state.
- R.
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