linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] mm/nommu.c: Fix improperly call of security API in mmap

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <6207.1255706090@redhat.com>
Date:	Fri, 16 Oct 2009 16:14:50 +0100
From:	David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
To:	Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>
Cc:	dhowells@...hat.com, graff.yang@...il.com,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, gyang@...ckfin.uclinux.org,
	akpm@...ux-foundation.org, uclinux-dist-devel@...ckfin.uclinux.org,
	Graff Yang <graf.yang@...log.com>,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] mm/nommu.c: Fix improperly call of security API in mmap

Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org> wrote:

> I really don't like seeing such irrelevant (that's not the right word,
> but I can't think what is) ifdefs creeping down into the security
> layer as LSM authors are likely to mess them up in the future.  I'd
> probably rather see the addr_only argument changed into a flags field.
>  One for addr_only and one flag for not_addr.  The nommu case could
> just set the not_addr flag and it's obvious how the LSMs (or
> capabilities if !CONFIG_SECURITY) should handle it, also works if some
> other future need arises...

A better way still, might be to deny the possibility of CONFIG_SECURITY if
CONFIG_MMU=n.  After all, security is sort of pointless when a userspace
program can just edit the kernel at a whim.

David
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/