Message-ID: <4AE04089.9020907@free.fr>
Date:	Thu, 22 Oct 2009 13:22:49 +0200
From:	Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@...e.fr>
To:	Oren Laadan <orenl@...rato.com>
CC:	Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	randy.dunlap@...cle.com, arnd@...db.de, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
	Containers <containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org>,
	Nathan Lynch <nathanl@...tin.ibm.com>,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Louis.Rilling@...labs.com,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
	kosaki.motohiro@...fujitsu.com, hpa@...or.com, mingo@...e.hu,
	torvalds@...ux-foundation.org,
	Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>, roland@...hat.com,
	Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@...nvz.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC][v8][PATCH 0/10] Implement clone3() system call

Oren Laadan wrote:
>
> Daniel Lezcano wrote:
>> Oren Laadan wrote:
>>> Daniel Lezcano wrote:
>> [ ... ]
>>
>>>> I forgot to mention a constraint with the specified pid : P2 has to
>>>> be child of P1.
>>>> In other word, you can not specify a pid to clonat which is not your
>>>> descendant (including yourself).
>>>> With this constraint I think there is no security issues.
>>> Sounds dangerous. What if your descendant executed a setuid program ?
>> That does not happen because you inherit the context of the caller.
>>
>>>> Concerning of forking on behalf of another process, we can consider
>>>> it is up to the caller / programmer to know what it does. If a
>>>> process in 
>>> Before the user can program with this syscall, _you_ need to define
>>> the semantics of this syscall. 
>> Yes, you are right. Here it is the proposition of the semantics.
>>
>> Function prototype is:
>>
>> pid_t cloneat(pid_t pid, pid_t hint, struct clone_args *args);
>>
>> Structure types are:
>>
>> typedef int clone_flag_t;
>>
>> struct clone_args {
>>     clone_flag_t *flags;
>>     int flags_size;
>>     u32 reserved1;
>>     u32 reserved2;
>>     u64 child_stack_base;
>>     u64 child_stack_size;
>>     u64 parent_tid_ptr;
>>     u64 child_tid_ptr;
>>     u64 reserved3;
>> };
>>
>> With the helper macros:
>>
>> void CLONE_SET(int flag, clone_flag_t *flags);
>> void CLONE_CLR(int flag, clone_flag_t *flags);
>> bool CLONE_ISSET(int flag, clone_flag_t *flags);
>> void CLONE_ZERO(flag_t *clone_flags);
>>
>> And:
>>
>> #define CLONEXT_VM      0x20  /* CLONE_VM>>3 */ #define CLONEXT_FS     
>> 0x21
>> #define CLONEXT_FILES   0x22
>> ...
>>
>
> The main motivation for your new syscall is to make it possible to
> inject a process into a namespace. IOW, what you are proposing is
> a new incarnation of sys_hijack().
>
> This is _orthogonal_ to the current discussion, which is about an
> extension for clone to allow (a) choosing target pid(s), (b) more
> flags, and (c) future extensions.
>
> (Your suggested syscall may, too, allow the request a specific set
> of pids for the child process, and reuse the current code for that).
>
> I suggest that you start a new thread about your RFC. This will
> reduce distractions on the current thread, and bring more focus to
> your proposal. I surely will post some comments there :)

I can argue exactly the same thing, the main motivation for your new 
syscall is to make it possible to restart a process tree for a 
checkpoint / restart and this is orthogonal with adding extended clone 
flags :)

But my main motivation is to have the possibility to a) choose a target 
__and__ b) clone the process relatively to another one. These 2 features 
allows to do what *we* need, that is recreate a process tree and the 
bonus with this approach is the ability to inject a process into a 
namespace, something asked by several people, eg. debug with gdb an 
application running into another pid namespace (is not supported today).

I am sorry for coming late in the discussion and for distracting.

> [...]
>
>> The cloneat syscall can be used for the following use cases:
>>
>> * checkpoint / restart:
>>
>> The restart can be done with a clone(.., CLONE_NEWPID|...);
>> Then the new pid (aka pid 1) retrieves the proctree from the statefile
>> and creates the different tasks with the process hierarchy with the
>> cloneat syscall.
>
> s/cloneat/$CLONE3/
> (hint: this is how it's done now)
Of course, what is described is what you does with 'clone3' !
Do you think I will come proposing a variant of 'clone3' not doing what 
you need ? :)

>> The proctree creation can be done from outside of the pid namespace or
>> from inside.
>
> Ew .. why would you do that ?
And why not. Is there a semantic specifying how a process tree should be 
recreated ?

>> Concerning nested pid namespaces, IMHO I would not try to checkpoint /
>> restart them. The checkpoint of a nested pid namespace should be
>> forbidden except for the leaf of a pid namespaces tree. That should
>
> Others (me included) *will* try and may get upset if forbidden...
> Seriously, there is no technical reason to restrict this.

Ok.

>  >> Can you define more precisely what you mean by "enter" the container ?
>>> If you simply want create a new process in the container, you can
>>> achieve the same thing with a daemon, or a smart init process (in
>>> there), or even ptrace tricks.
>> Yes, you can launch a daemon inside the container, that works for a
>> system container because the container is killed by killing the first
>> process of the container or by a shutdown inside the container (not
>> fully implemented in the kernel).
>> But this is unreliable for application containers, I won't enter in the
>> details but the container exits when the application exits, with a
>> daemon inside the container, this is no longer the case because you can
>> not detect the application death as the daemon is always there.
>>
>> With cloneat you restrict the life cycle of the command you launched,
>> that is the container exits as soon as all the processes exited the
>> container, including the spawned command itself.
>
> Then start a daemon _in addition_ to the application, or write a
> daemon that will launch the application and monitor it... And also
> there is ptrace -
Already tried :)

http://lxc.git.sourceforge.net/git/gitweb.cgi?p=lxc/lxc;a=blob;f=src/lxc/lxc_cinit.c;h=8f235483c1a9d9c9e0cc1ba69f1c33f1bc98b8aa;hb=57ff723f6a174a2a01c58c6ac367d118ef12b91c

> But, please let's take this off to a new thread about adding how to
> add a process into a namespace from the outside. FYI, I do think
> such an interface may be useful and nicer than the two alternatives
> I suggested above.
>
>>> Also, there is a reason why sys_hijack() was hijacked away ... And
>>> I honestly think that a syscall to force another process to clone
>>> would be shot down by the kernel guys.
>> Maybe, maybe not. CLONE_PARENT exists and looks similar to cloneat.
>
> Actually, I misread previously; I mean not forcing another process
> to clone, but instead forcing another process to become a parent (and
> I shall ignore the ethical issues :)
>
> I still suspect it won't be welcome. Several people would have liked
> to see CLONE_PARENT go away, too, if that was possible without breaking
> userspace applications. Yet another reason to take it to a discussion
> of its own.

At this point, I am hesitating of creating a new thread for this 
discussion. Because, there will be:
 * clone
 * clone2
 * clone3

and we will discuss again about a new clone syscall with a different API :(

I will not continue arguing on this thread except if someone is in favor 
of cloneat.
Otherwise, I will spawn a new thread later.

Thanks
  -- Daniel

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