linux-kernel - Re: symlinks with permissions

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Message-Id: <1256579869.8576.7.camel@heimdal.trondhjem.org>
Date:	Mon, 26 Oct 2009 13:57:49 -0400
From:	Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@....uio.no>
To:	Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>
Cc:	"J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@...ldses.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@...ibm.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
	kernel list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, viro@...iv.linux.org.uk,
	jamie@...reable.org
Subject: Re: symlinks with permissions

On Mon, 2009-10-26 at 18:46 +0100, Jan Kara wrote:
>   That's what I'd think as well but it does not as I've just learned and
> tested :) proc_pid_follow_link actually directly gives a dentry of the
> target file without checking permissions on the way.
> 
> 								Honza

I seem to remember that is deliberate, the point being that a symlink
in /proc/*/fd/ may contain a path that refers to a private namespace.

Cheers
  Trond

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