[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20091027081141.GF5019@elf.ucw.cz>
Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2009 09:11:41 +0100
From: Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>
To: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@....uio.no>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>, "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@...ldses.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@...ibm.com>,
kernel list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, viro@...iv.linux.org.uk,
jamie@...reable.org
Subject: Re: symlinks with permissions
On Mon 2009-10-26 14:22:16, Trond Myklebust wrote:
> On Sun, 2009-10-25 at 10:36 +0100, Pavel Machek wrote:
> > Well, it is unexpected and mild security hole.
> >
> > Part of the problem is that even if you have read-only
> > filedescriptor, you can upgrade it to read-write, even if path is
> > inaccessible to you.
> >
> > So if someone passes you read-only filedescriptor, you can still write
> > to it.
>
> If someone passes you a file descriptor, can't you in any case play
> games with, openat(fd,"",O_RDWR), in order to achieve the same thing? I
> must admit I haven't tried it yet, but at a first glance I can't see
> anything that prevents me from doing this...
According to my documentation, openat needs directory fd.
Pavel
--
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists