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Message-Id: <200910300056.IFD65194.MSOLHFOVJQtOFF@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Date: Fri, 30 Oct 2009 00:56:53 +0900
From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>
To: serue@...ibm.com, viro@...iv.linux.org.uk
Cc: linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [TOMOYO #16 01/25] LSM: Add security_path_chmod() andsecurity_path_chown().
Hello.
Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> Quoting Tetsuo Handa (penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp):
> > This patch allows pathname based LSM modules to check chmod()/chown()
> > operations. Since notify_change() does not receive "struct vfsmount *",
> > we add security_path_chmod() and security_path_chown() to the caller of
> > notify_change().
> >
> > These hooks are used by TOMOYO.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>
> > ---
> > fs/open.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++----
> > include/linux/security.h | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > security/capability.c | 13 +++++++++++++
> > security/security.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
> > 4 files changed, 78 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> >
> > --- security-testing-2.6.orig/fs/open.c
> > +++ security-testing-2.6/fs/open.c
> > @@ -616,6 +616,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(fchmod, unsigned int, fd
> > err = mnt_want_write_file(file);
> > if (err)
> > goto out_putf;
> > + err = security_path_chmod(dentry, file->f_vfsmnt, mode);
> > + if (err)
> > + goto out_drop_write;
> > mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
>
> Isn't doing the security check before the mutex_lock racy?
>
> Any reason not to move it into the lock? (since you had
> considered putting a path hook in notify_change() I assume
> not?)
>
None for security_path_chmod(). None for security_path_chown() if we are
allowed to pass "struct vfsmount" to chown_common().
> -serge
>
Al, is it OK to pass "struct vfsmount" to chown_common() so that
security_path_chown() is called after mutex_lock()?
----------
[PATCH] LSM: Move security_path_chmod()/security_path_chown() to after mutex_lock().
We should call security_path_chmod()/security_path_chown() after mutex_lock()
in order to avoid races.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>
---
fs/open.c | 36 +++++++++++++++---------------------
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
--- security-testing-2.6.orig/fs/open.c
+++ security-testing-2.6/fs/open.c
@@ -619,17 +619,17 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(fchmod, unsigned int, fd
err = mnt_want_write_file(file);
if (err)
goto out_putf;
+ mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
err = security_path_chmod(dentry, file->f_vfsmnt, mode);
if (err)
- goto out_drop_write;
- mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
+ goto out_unlock;
if (mode == (mode_t) -1)
mode = inode->i_mode;
newattrs.ia_mode = (mode & S_IALLUGO) | (inode->i_mode & ~S_IALLUGO);
newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE | ATTR_CTIME;
err = notify_change(dentry, &newattrs);
+out_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
-out_drop_write:
mnt_drop_write(file->f_path.mnt);
out_putf:
fput(file);
@@ -652,17 +652,17 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(fchmodat, int, dfd, cons
error = mnt_want_write(path.mnt);
if (error)
goto dput_and_out;
+ mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
error = security_path_chmod(path.dentry, path.mnt, mode);
if (error)
- goto out_drop_write;
- mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
+ goto out_unlock;
if (mode == (mode_t) -1)
mode = inode->i_mode;
newattrs.ia_mode = (mode & S_IALLUGO) | (inode->i_mode & ~S_IALLUGO);
newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE | ATTR_CTIME;
error = notify_change(path.dentry, &newattrs);
+out_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
-out_drop_write:
mnt_drop_write(path.mnt);
dput_and_out:
path_put(&path);
@@ -675,9 +675,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(chmod, const char __user
return sys_fchmodat(AT_FDCWD, filename, mode);
}
-static int chown_common(struct dentry * dentry, uid_t user, gid_t group)
+static int chown_common(struct path *path, uid_t user, gid_t group)
{
- struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
+ struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
int error;
struct iattr newattrs;
@@ -694,7 +694,9 @@ static int chown_common(struct dentry *
newattrs.ia_valid |=
ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_KILL_PRIV;
mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
- error = notify_change(dentry, &newattrs);
+ error = security_path_chown(path, user, group);
+ if (!error)
+ error = notify_change(path->dentry, &newattrs);
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
return error;
@@ -711,9 +713,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(chown, const char __user
error = mnt_want_write(path.mnt);
if (error)
goto out_release;
- error = security_path_chown(&path, user, group);
- if (!error)
- error = chown_common(path.dentry, user, group);
+ error = chown_common(&path, user, group);
mnt_drop_write(path.mnt);
out_release:
path_put(&path);
@@ -738,9 +738,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(fchownat, int, dfd, cons
error = mnt_want_write(path.mnt);
if (error)
goto out_release;
- error = security_path_chown(&path, user, group);
- if (!error)
- error = chown_common(path.dentry, user, group);
+ error = chown_common(&path, user, group);
mnt_drop_write(path.mnt);
out_release:
path_put(&path);
@@ -759,9 +757,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(lchown, const char __use
error = mnt_want_write(path.mnt);
if (error)
goto out_release;
- error = security_path_chown(&path, user, group);
- if (!error)
- error = chown_common(path.dentry, user, group);
+ error = chown_common(&path, user, group);
mnt_drop_write(path.mnt);
out_release:
path_put(&path);
@@ -784,9 +780,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(fchown, unsigned int, fd
goto out_fput;
dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
audit_inode(NULL, dentry);
- error = security_path_chown(&file->f_path, user, group);
- if (!error)
- error = chown_common(dentry, user, group);
+ error = chown_common(&file->f_path, user, group);
mnt_drop_write(file->f_path.mnt);
out_fput:
fput(file);
--
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