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Message-ID: <20091029053208.GD11558@us.ibm.com>
Date: Thu, 29 Oct 2009 00:32:08 -0500
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@...ibm.com>
To: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [TOMOYO #16 02/25] LSM: Add security_path_chroot().
Quoting Tetsuo Handa (penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp):
> This patch allows pathname based LSM modules to check chroot() operations.
>
> This hook is used by TOMOYO.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@...ibm.com>
> ---
> fs/open.c | 3 +++
> include/linux/security.h | 11 +++++++++++
> security/capability.c | 6 ++++++
> security/security.c | 5 +++++
> 4 files changed, 25 insertions(+)
>
> --- security-testing-2.6.orig/fs/open.c
> +++ security-testing-2.6/fs/open.c
> @@ -587,6 +587,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(chroot, const char __use
> error = -EPERM;
> if (!capable(CAP_SYS_CHROOT))
> goto dput_and_out;
> + error = security_path_chroot(&path);
> + if (error)
> + goto dput_and_out;
>
> set_fs_root(current->fs, &path);
> error = 0;
> --- security-testing-2.6.orig/include/linux/security.h
> +++ security-testing-2.6/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -459,6 +459,10 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opt
> * @uid contains new owner's ID.
> * @gid contains new group's ID.
> * Return 0 if permission is granted.
> + * @path_chroot:
> + * Check for permission to change root directory.
> + * @path contains the path structure.
> + * Return 0 if permission is granted.
> * @inode_readlink:
> * Check the permission to read the symbolic link.
> * @dentry contains the dentry structure for the file link.
> @@ -1503,6 +1507,7 @@ struct security_operations {
> int (*path_chmod) (struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
> mode_t mode);
> int (*path_chown) (struct path *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid);
> + int (*path_chroot) (struct path *path);
> #endif
>
> int (*inode_alloc_security) (struct inode *inode);
> @@ -2970,6 +2975,7 @@ int security_path_rename(struct path *ol
> int security_path_chmod(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
> mode_t mode);
> int security_path_chown(struct path *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid);
> +int security_path_chroot(struct path *path);
> #else /* CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */
> static inline int security_path_unlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
> {
> @@ -3031,6 +3037,11 @@ static inline int security_path_chown(st
> {
> return 0;
> }
> +
> +static inline int security_path_chroot(struct path *path)
> +{
> + return 0;
> +}
> #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
> --- security-testing-2.6.orig/security/capability.c
> +++ security-testing-2.6/security/capability.c
> @@ -319,6 +319,11 @@ static int cap_path_chown(struct path *p
> {
> return 0;
> }
> +
> +static int cap_path_chroot(struct path *root)
> +{
> + return 0;
> +}
> #endif
>
> static int cap_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
> @@ -990,6 +995,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_
> set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_truncate);
> set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_chmod);
> set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_chown);
> + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_chroot);
> #endif
> set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_permission);
> set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_alloc_security);
> --- security-testing-2.6.orig/security/security.c
> +++ security-testing-2.6/security/security.c
> @@ -449,6 +449,11 @@ int security_path_chown(struct path *pat
> return 0;
> return security_ops->path_chown(path, uid, gid);
> }
> +
> +int security_path_chroot(struct path *path)
> +{
> + return security_ops->path_chroot(path);
> +}
> #endif
>
> int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode)
>
> --
> --
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