[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20091031023010.GB17680@shareable.org>
Date: Sat, 31 Oct 2009 02:30:10 +0000
From: Jamie Lokier <jamie@...reable.org>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@....uio.no>,
Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>,
"J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@...ldses.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@...ibm.com>,
kernel list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, viro@...iv.linux.org.uk
Subject: Re: symlinks with permissions
Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz> writes:
> >> How many linux shell scripts and other applications that use /dev/fd/N
> >> or /proc/self/fd/N will you be breaking?
> >
> > Zero. (Well unless someone is exploiting it in wild).
>
> There are other differences like different offsets etc that may matter.
>
> >> Closing a theoretical security hole at the expense of breaking real
> >> applications is a show stopper.
> >
> > I don't plan to remove /proc/*/fd; but I would like it to behave like
> > dup().
> >
> > (I still hope some security team does work for me :-).
Yes, it must not be like dup(), sharing the file pointer, because I'm
sure that really will break some programs.
Like all the ones using gnulib (formerly libiberty) which use
/proc/self/fd/N/path/to/file to implement fake openat(N,"path/to/file").
> I bet you will get a lot more traction and discussion if you write
> a basic mostly working version of the patch.
I agree, and I'll be happy to review/break it ;-)
-- Jamie
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists