Message-Id: <200911040441.nA44fxms062617@www262.sakura.ne.jp>
Date:	Wed, 04 Nov 2009 13:41:59 +0900
From:	Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>
To:	john.johansen@...onical.com
Cc:	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [Patch 0/12] AppArmor security module

Hello.

Some random topics I noticed. I need to use lxr for further review.

John Johansen wrote:
[01/12]
+static int d_namespace_path(struct path *path, char *buf, int buflen,
+                           char **name, int flags)
+{
+       struct path root, tmp, ns_root = { };
+       char *res;
+       int error = 0;
+
+       read_lock(&current->fs->lock);
+       root = current->fs->root;
+       path_get(&current->fs->root);
+       read_unlock(&current->fs->lock);
+       spin_lock(&vfsmount_lock);
+       if (root.mnt && root.mnt->mnt_ns)
+               ns_root.mnt = mntget(root.mnt->mnt_ns->root);
+       if (ns_root.mnt)
+               ns_root.dentry = dget(ns_root.mnt->mnt_root);
+       spin_unlock(&vfsmount_lock);
+       spin_lock(&dcache_lock);
+       tmp = ns_root;
+       res = __d_path(path, &tmp, buf, buflen);
+
+       *name = res;
+       /* handle error conditions - and still allow a partial path to
+        * be returned.
+        */
+       if (IS_ERR(res)) {
+               error = PTR_ERR(res);
+               *name = buf;
+       } else if (d_unlinked(path->dentry)) {
+               /* The stripping of (deleted) is a hack that could be removed
+                * with an updated __d_path
+                */
+

Yes, we know. But .... isn't there a race window that the file is unlink()ed
between __d_path() and d_unlinked(path->dentry) ? Holding dcache_lock prevents
this race?

+               if (!path->dentry->d_inode) {
+                       /* On some filesystems, newly allocated dentries appear
+                        * to the security_path hooks as a deleted
+                        * dentry except without an inode allocated.
+                        *
+                        * Remove the appended deleted text and return as a
+                        * string for normal mediation.  The (deleted) string
+                        * is guarenteed to be added in this case, so just
+                        * strip it.
+                        */
+                       buf[buflen - 11] = 0;   /* - (len(" (deleted)") +\0) */
+               } else if (flags & PFLAG_DELETED_NAMES &&
+                          (buf + buflen) - res > 11 &&
+                          strcmp(buf + buflen - 11, " (deleted)") == 0) {
+                       buf[buflen - 11] = 0;   /* - (len(" (deleted)") +\0) */
+               } else
+                       error = -ENOENT;
+       } else if (flags & ~PFLAG_CONNECT_PATH &&
+                  tmp.dentry != ns_root.dentry && tmp.mnt != ns_root.mnt) {
+               /* disconnected path, don't return pathname starting with '/' */
+               error = -ESTALE;
+               if (*res == '/')
+                       *name = res + 1;
+       }
+
+       spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);
+       path_put(&root);
+       path_put(&ns_root);
+
+       return error;
+}



[02/12]
+static int aa_audit_base(int type, struct aa_profile *profile,
+			 struct aa_audit *sa, struct audit_context *audit_cxt,
+			 void (*cb) (struct audit_buffer *, void *))
+{
+	struct audit_buffer *ab = NULL;

You can add

	struct task_struct *task = sa->task ? sa->task : current;

and replace subsequent "sa->task ? ... : ...".

+
+	if (profile && PROFILE_KILL(profile) && type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED)
+		type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
+
+	ab = audit_log_start(audit_cxt, sa->gfp_mask, type);
+
+	if (!ab) {
+		AA_ERROR("(%d) Unable to log event of type (%d)\n",
+			 -ENOMEM, type);

Don't you want

	if (type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL)
		(void)send_sig_info(SIGKILL, NULL,
				sa->task ? sa->task : current);

so that process is killed when audit_log_start() failed?

+		/* don't fail operations in complain mode even if logging
+		 * fails */
+		return type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	if (aa_g_audit_header)
+		audit_log_format(ab, "type=%s ",
+				 aa_audit_type[type - AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT]);
+
+	if (sa->operation)
+		audit_log_format(ab, "operation=\"%s\"", sa->operation);
+
+	if (sa->info) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " info=\"%s\"", sa->info);
+		if (sa->error)
+			audit_log_format(ab, " error=%d", sa->error);
+	}
+
+	audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d",
+			 sa->task ? sa->task->pid : current->pid);
+
+	if (profile) {
+		pid_t pid = sa->task ? sa->task->real_parent->pid :
+				       current->real_parent->pid;
+		audit_log_format(ab, " parent=%d", pid);
+		audit_log_format(ab, " profile=");
+		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, profile->fqname);
+
+		if (profile->ns != default_namespace) {
+			audit_log_format(ab, " namespace=");
+			audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, profile->ns->base.name);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (cb)
+		cb(ab, sa);
+
+	audit_log_end(ab);

Not checking -ENOMEM failures for audit_log_format() etc. might cause
partial audit logs. Is it OK?

+
+	if (type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL)
+		(void)send_sig_info(SIGKILL, NULL,
+				    sa->task ? sa->task : current);
+
+	return type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED ? 0 : sa->error;
+}



[03/12]
+static inline void aa_free_file_context(struct aa_file_cxt *cxt)
+{
+       aa_put_profile(cxt->profile);
+       memset(cxt, 0, sizeof(struct aa_file_cxt));
+       kfree(cxt);
+}

Why not kzfree(cxt); instead of memset() + kfree() ?



[04/12]
+void aa_free_default_namespace(void)
+{
+       write_lock(&ns_list_lock);
+       list_del_init(&default_namespace->base.list);
+       aa_put_namespace(default_namespace);
+       write_unlock(&ns_list_lock);
+       aa_put_namespace(default_namespace);
+       default_namespace = NULL;
+}

Any reason to call aa_put_namespace(default_namespace); with a lock and
without a lock?



[06/12]
+static int unpack_dynstring(struct aa_ext *e, char **string, const char *name)
+{
+       char *tmp;
+       void *pos = e->pos;
+       int res = unpack_string(e, &tmp, name);
+       *string = NULL;
+
+       if (!res)
+               return res;

	return 0; ?

+
+       *string = kstrdup(tmp, GFP_KERNEL);
+       if (!*string) {
+               e->pos = pos;
+               return 0;
+       }
+
+       return res;
+}


+static int aa_unpack_trans_table(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+       void *pos = e->pos;
+
+       /* exec table is optional */
+       if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "xtable")) {
+               int i, size;
+
+               size = unpack_array(e, NULL);
+               /* currently 4 exec bits and entries 0-3 are reserved iupcx */
+               if (size > 16 - 4)
+                       goto fail;
+               profile->file.trans.table = kzalloc(sizeof(char *) * size,
+                                                   GFP_KERNEL);
+               if (!profile->file.trans.table)
+                       goto fail;
+

		profile->file.trans.size = size;

+               for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
+                       char *tmp;
+                       if (!unpack_dynstring(e, &tmp, NULL))
+                               goto fail;
+                       /*
+                        * note: strings beginning with a : have an embedded
+                        * \0 seperating the profile ns name from the profile
+                        * name
+                        */
+                       profile->file.trans.table[i] = tmp;
+               }
+               if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_ARRAYEND, NULL))
+                       goto fail;
+               if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL))
+                       goto fail;
+               profile->file.trans.size = size;

This assignment is too late to pass the size to aa_free_domain_entries().

+       }
+       return 1;
+
+fail:
+       e->pos = pos;
+       return 0;
+}

+ssize_t aa_interface_add_profiles(void *data, size_t size)
+{
+       struct aa_profile *profile;
+       struct aa_namespace *ns = NULL;
+       struct aa_policy_common *common;
+       struct aa_ext e = {
+               .start = data,
+               .end = data + size,
+               .pos = data,
+               .ns_name = NULL
+       };
+       ssize_t error;
+       struct aa_audit_iface sa;
+       aa_audit_init(&sa, "profile_load", &e);
+
+       error = aa_verify_header(&e, &sa);
+       if (error)
+               return error;
+
+       profile = aa_unpack_profile(&e, &sa);
+       if (IS_ERR(profile))
+               return PTR_ERR(profile);
+
+       sa.name2 = e.ns_name;
+       ns = aa_prepare_namespace(e.ns_name);
+       if (IS_ERR(ns)) {
+               sa.base.info = "failed to prepare namespace";
+               sa.base.error = PTR_ERR(ns);
+               goto fail;
+       }
+       /* profiles are currently loaded flat with fqnames */
+       sa.name = profile->fqname;
+
+       write_lock(&ns->base.lock);
+
+       common = __aa_find_parent_by_fqname(ns, sa.name);
+       if (!common) {
+               sa.base.info = "parent does not exist";
+               sa.base.error = -ENOENT;
+               goto fail2;
+       }
+
+       if (common != &ns->base)
+               profile->parent = aa_get_profile((struct aa_profile *)common);
+
+       if (__aa_find_profile(&common->profiles, profile->base.name)) {
+               /* A profile with this name exists already. */
+               sa.base.info = "profile already exists";
+               sa.base.error = -EEXIST;

Don't you need to call aa_put_profile(common) if common != &ns->base ?

+               goto fail2;
+       }
+       profile->sid = aa_alloc_sid(AA_ALLOC_SYS_SID);
+       profile->ns = aa_get_namespace(ns);
+
+       __aa_add_profile(common, profile);
+       write_unlock(&ns->base.lock);
+
+       aa_audit_iface(&sa);
+       aa_put_namespace(ns);
+       return size;
+
+fail2:
+       write_unlock(&ns->base.lock);
+
+fail:
+       error = aa_audit_iface(&sa);
+       aa_put_namespace(ns);
+       aa_put_profile(profile);
+       return error;
+}



[07/12]
+static struct aa_profile *next_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+       struct aa_profile *parent;
+       struct aa_namespace *ns = profile->ns;
+
+       if (!list_empty(&profile->base.profiles))
+               return list_first_entry(&profile->base.profiles,
+                                       struct aa_profile, base.list);
+
+       parent = profile->parent;
+       while (parent) {
+               list_for_each_entry_continue(profile, &parent->base.profiles,
+                                            base.list)
+                       return profile;
+               profile = parent;
+               parent = parent->parent;
+       }
+
+       list_for_each_entry_continue(profile, &ns->base.profiles, base.list)
+               return profile;
+
+       read_unlock(&ns->base.lock);
+       list_for_each_entry_continue(ns, &ns_list, base.list) {
+               read_lock(&ns->base.lock);
+               return list_first_entry(&ns->base.profiles, struct aa_profile,
+                                       base.list);
+               read_unlock(&ns->base.lock);

This read_unlock() unreachable?

+       }
+       return NULL;
+}

+int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_namespace *ns, struct aa_profile *profile,
+                  char **string)
+{
+       char *str;
+       int len = 0;
+
+       if (profile) {
+               int mode_len, name_len, ns_len = 0;
+               const char *mode_str = profile_mode_names[profile->mode];
+               char *s;
+
+               mode_len = strlen(mode_str) + 3;        /* _(mode_str)\n */
+               name_len = strlen(profile->fqname);
+               if (ns != default_namespace)
+                       ns_len = strlen(ns->base.name) + 3;
+               len = mode_len + ns_len + name_len + 1;
+               s = str = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_ATOMIC);
+               if (!str)
+                       return -ENOMEM;
+
+               if (ns_len) {
+                       sprintf(s, "%s://", ns->base.name);
+                       s += ns_len;
+               }
+               memcpy(s, profile->fqname, name_len);
+               s += name_len;
+               sprintf(s, " (%s)\n", mode_str);
+       } else {
+               const char unconfined_str[] = "unconfined\n";
+
+               len = sizeof(unconfined_str) - 1;
+               if (ns != default_namespace)
+                       len += strlen(ns->base.name) + 3;
+
+               str = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_ATOMIC);
+               if (!str)
+                       return -ENOMEM;
+
+               if (ns != default_namespace)
+                       sprintf(str, "%s://%s", ns->base.name, unconfined_str);
+               else
+                       memcpy(str, unconfined_str, len);

You need to copy one more byte to make str \0-terminated.

			memcpy(str, unconfined_str, len + 1);

+       }
+       *string = str;
+
+       return len;
+}



[10/12]
+static int aa_may_change_ptraced_domain(struct task_struct *task,
+                                       struct aa_profile *to_profile)
+{
+       struct task_struct *tracer;
+       struct cred *cred = NULL;
+       struct aa_profile *tracerp = NULL;
+       int error = 0;
+
+       rcu_read_lock();
+       tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(task);
+       if (tracer)
+               cred = aa_get_task_policy(tracer, &tracerp);
+       rcu_read_unlock();
+
+       if (!tracerp)

Don't you need to call put_cred(cred); because aa_get_task_policy() calls
get_task_cred() but aa_cred_policy() may set tracerp to NULL ?

+               return error;
+
+       error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracerp, to_profile, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
+       put_cred(cred);
+
+       return error;
+}



[11/12]
+static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
+       .name = "apparmor",
+
+       .ptrace_access_check = apparmor_ptrace_access_check,
+       .ptrace_traceme = apparmor_ptrace_traceme,
+       .capget = apparmor_capget,
+       .sysctl = apparmor_sysctl,
+       .capable = apparmor_capable,
+
+       .path_link = apparmor_path_link,
+       .path_unlink = apparmor_path_unlink,
+       .path_symlink = apparmor_path_symlink,
+       .path_mkdir = apparmor_path_mkdir,
+       .path_rmdir = apparmor_path_rmdir,
+       .path_mknod = apparmor_path_mknod,
+       .path_rename = apparmor_path_rename,
+       .path_truncate = apparmor_path_truncate,
+       .dentry_open = apparmor_dentry_open,
+
+       .file_permission = apparmor_file_permission,
+       .file_alloc_security = apparmor_file_alloc_security,
+       .file_free_security = apparmor_file_free_security,
+       .file_mmap = apparmor_file_mmap,
+       .file_mprotect = apparmor_file_mprotect,
+       .file_lock = apparmor_file_lock,
+
+       .getprocattr = apparmor_getprocattr,
+       .setprocattr = apparmor_setprocattr,
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_NETWORK
+       .socket_create = apparmor_socket_create,
+       .socket_post_create = apparmor_socket_post_create,
+       .socket_bind = apparmor_socket_bind,
+       .socket_connect = apparmor_socket_connect,
+       .socket_listen = apparmor_socket_listen,
+       .socket_accept = apparmor_socket_accept,
+       .socket_sendmsg = apparmor_socket_sendmsg,
+       .socket_recvmsg = apparmor_socket_recvmsg,
+       .socket_getsockname = apparmor_socket_getsockname,
+       .socket_getpeername = apparmor_socket_getpeername,
+       .socket_getsockopt = apparmor_socket_getsockopt,
+       .socket_setsockopt = apparmor_socket_setsockopt,
+       .socket_shutdown = apparmor_socket_shutdown,
+#endif
+
+       .cred_free = apparmor_cred_free,
+       .cred_prepare = apparmor_cred_prepare,
+
+       .bprm_set_creds = apparmor_bprm_set_creds,
+       .bprm_committing_creds = apparmor_bprm_committing_creds,
+       .bprm_committed_creds = apparmor_bprm_committed_creds,
+       .bprm_secureexec = apparmor_bprm_secureexec,
+
+       .task_setrlimit = apparmor_task_setrlimit,
+};

Don't you need to define ".cred_alloc_blank" and ".cred_transfer" ?

+static int set_init_cxt(void)
+{
+       struct cred *cred = (struct cred *)current->real_cred;
+       struct aa_task_context *cxt;
+
+       cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(GFP_KERNEL);
+       if (!cxt)
+               return -ENOMEM;
+
+       cxt->sys.profile = aa_get_profile(default_namespace->unconfined);
+       cred->security = cxt;
+
+       return 0;
+}

You can add __init to this function.
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