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Message-ID: <4AF9CC43.50103@zytor.com>
Date: Tue, 10 Nov 2009 12:25:39 -0800
From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
To: Kees Cook <kees.cook@...onical.com>
CC: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...radead.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, x86@...nel.org,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@...helsinki.fi>,
Jan Beulich <jbeulich@...ell.com>,
Vegard Nossum <vegardno@....uio.no>,
Yinghai Lu <yinghai@...nel.org>,
Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@...rix.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4] [x86] detect and report lack of NX protections
The more I stare at the underlying code, the more I'm convinced that the
fundamental problem is that the underlying code is insane, with multiple
levels of detection for what amounts to cpu_has_nx, each effectively
checking what the previous code has done.
check_efer(), for example, screws with EFER, but EFER is simply set in
head_64.S from CPUID (unless Xen does something insane -- but if so, Xen
should clear X86_FEATURE_NX instead.)
The 32-bit startup code also sets NX, but yet on 32 bits we wiggle EFER
as if it had never been. This code is screaming for cleanup and
unification.
-hpa
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