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Date:	Fri, 13 Nov 2009 19:06:17 -0800
From:	Casey Schaufler <>
CC:	James Morris <>, Julia Lawall <>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <>,
	Stephen Smalley <>,
	Eric Paris <>,,,
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/4] security/selinux: decrement sizeof size in strncmp wrote:
> On Thu, 12 Nov 2009 18:11:55 PST, Casey Schaufler said:
>> James Morris wrote:
>>> Do you see potential for a buffer overrun in this case?
>> No, but I hate arguing with people who think that every time
>> they see strcmp that they have found a security flaw.
> How do you feel about people who think every time they see strcmp()
> "Oh crap, something that needs auditing"? ;)

They have my deep sympathy. Which is why I'm advocating leaving
the perfectly functional and correct use of strncmp() as it is.

> The biggest problem with strcmp() is that even if it got audited when that code
> went in, it's prone to unaudited breakage when somebody changes something in
> some other piece of code, quite often in some other .c file in some other
> directory.
> Julia, is there a way to use coccinelle to detect unsafe changes like that?  Or
> is expressing those semantics too difficult?

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