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Message-Id: <20091117141314.0238a49b.akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2009 14:13:14 -0800
From: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
To: Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>, graff.yang@...il.com,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, gyang@...ckfin.uclinux.org,
uclinux-dist-devel@...ckfin.uclinux.org,
Graff Yang <graf.yang@...log.com>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] mm/nommu.c: Fix improperly call of security API in mmap
On Fri, 16 Oct 2009 11:55:29 -0400
Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com> wrote:
> On Fri, 2009-10-16 at 16:43 +0100, David Howells wrote:
> > Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com> wrote:
> >
> > > That would still call cap_file_mmap() and wouldn't solve your problem.
> >
> > Hmmm... I guess I don't see the problem occur because I always run the
> > programs as root.
>
> most likely yes, your processes are going to have CAP_SYS_RAWIO and will
> happily sail through the cap_file_mmap().
>
> > I would guess that cap_file_mmap() and selinux_file_mmap() are, perhaps, too
> > strict. The hint shouldn't be rejected unless MAP_FIXED is also set, surely,
> > but should rather be revised upwards.
>
> On the mmu side we don't check until the kernel has turned the hint into
> a real address. Which is apparently different then where the hook was
> originally placed in the nommu side.
>
> > Certainly, addr==NULL and !MAP_FIXED is a reasonable case to permit, even in
> > tightly secured MMU and SELinux mode... After all, the manual page says:
> >
> > If addr is NULL, then the kernel chooses the address at which to create
> > the mapping; this is the most portable method of creating a new map-
> > ping.
>
> I agree, I think the choices are
>
> A) agree that we just shouldn't check the address on nommu
> A1) change kconfig to not allow the setting of these
> (easy to do for the LSM check, but not easy as it stands today
> for the cap_file_mmap() check)
> A2) change the addr_only to be a flags which indicate not to check
> (my original suggestion)
> A3) push the config_nommu down into the security code
> (your patch)
> B) actually check the address, which requires moving the hook to a
> location where it has been resolved.
> (graff yang's patch)
>
> I'll leave it up to you to determine which you like the best since you
> know the implications of nommu.
>
So what's the status of this issue now? Should I merge the below into
2.6.32?
Thanks.
From: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
Ignore the address parameter in the various file_mmap() security checks
when CONFIG_MMU=n as the address hint is ignored under those
circumstances, and in any case the minimum mapping address check is
pointless in NOMMU mode.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
Reported-by: Graff Yang <graf.yang@...log.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
---
include/linux/security.h | 1 +
mm/nommu.c | 2 +-
security/commoncap.c | 2 ++
security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 ++
4 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff -puN include/linux/security.h~nommu-ignore-the-address-parameter-in-the-file_mmap-security-check include/linux/security.h
--- a/include/linux/security.h~nommu-ignore-the-address-parameter-in-the-file_mmap-security-check
+++ a/include/linux/security.h
@@ -609,6 +609,7 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opt
* @reqprot contains the protection requested by the application.
* @prot contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
* @flags contains the operational flags.
+ * @addr contains the mapping address, and should be ignored in NOMMU mode.
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
* @file_mprotect:
* Check permissions before changing memory access permissions.
diff -puN mm/nommu.c~nommu-ignore-the-address-parameter-in-the-file_mmap-security-check mm/nommu.c
--- a/mm/nommu.c~nommu-ignore-the-address-parameter-in-the-file_mmap-security-check
+++ a/mm/nommu.c
@@ -974,7 +974,7 @@ static int validate_mmap_request(struct
}
/* allow the security API to have its say */
- ret = security_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, 0);
+ ret = security_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, 0, 0);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
diff -puN security/commoncap.c~nommu-ignore-the-address-parameter-in-the-file_mmap-security-check security/commoncap.c
--- a/security/commoncap.c~nommu-ignore-the-address-parameter-in-the-file_mmap-security-check
+++ a/security/commoncap.c
@@ -1005,6 +1005,7 @@ int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, uns
{
int ret = 0;
+#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
if (addr < dac_mmap_min_addr) {
ret = cap_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_RAWIO,
SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
@@ -1012,5 +1013,6 @@ int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, uns
if (ret == 0)
current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
}
+#endif
return ret;
}
diff -puN security/selinux/hooks.c~nommu-ignore-the-address-parameter-in-the-file_mmap-security-check security/selinux/hooks.c
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c~nommu-ignore-the-address-parameter-in-the-file_mmap-security-check
+++ a/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3046,6 +3046,7 @@ static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file
unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
{
int rc = 0;
+#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
u32 sid = current_sid();
/*
@@ -3060,6 +3061,7 @@ static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file
if (rc)
return rc;
}
+#endif
/* do DAC check on address space usage */
rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
_
--
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