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Message-ID: <551280e50911181036q1b186b8ei2cea995d2543c125@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2009 10:36:20 -0800
From: "Andrew G. Morgan" <morgan@...nel.org>
To: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@...hat.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@...ibm.com>,
lkml <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
Kees Cook <kees.cook@...onical.com>,
Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@...e.de>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com>,
George Wilson <gcwilson@...ibm.com>,
KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@...gai.gr.jp>
Subject: Re: drop SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES?
On Wed, Nov 18, 2009 at 9:49 AM, Steve Grubb <sgrubb@...hat.com> wrote:
> On Wednesday 18 November 2009 11:40:13 am Andrew G. Morgan wrote:
>> >> But back to detecting the capability version number...if I pass 0 as the
>> >> version in the header, why can't the kernel just say oh you want the
>> >> preferred version number, stuff it in the header, and return the syscall
>> >> with success and not EINVAL?
>>
>> This is so a library can understand that it doesn't understand the
>> current ABI.
>
> If user space is passing a NULL for the cap_user_data_t argument, user space
> has a pretty good idea that its not expecting actual capabilities to be filled
> in. My basic point is that there is no way to "correctly" use the capabilities
> API to determine what the preferred version is.
But older kernels didn't do that.
>> For example, consider the case of some kernel of the
>> future with a different ABI meeting an old library.
>
> Right. Either user space checks version numbers to verify it knows what its
> doing and errors out, or it blindly tries to set capabilities and gets an
> error. Either way, if user space is *really* using the API to do work, it
> won't be passing NULL as the user data argument.
>
> Maybe if version is set to 0 and NULL is being passed for arg 2 to getcap,
> that would be the secret handshake that lets the kernel know all I want is the
> preferred version number and nothing else since there is no data structure to
> fill in.
>
>
>> The intention is for it to fail safe and not blunder on doing
>> "security" related operations with an imperfect idea of the current
>> kernel interface.
>>
>> This is how libcap figures out it can work with the hosting kernel:
>
> capget(0x20080522, 0, NULL) = -1 EFAULT (Bad address)
I'm not sure what this is supposed to do. This system call takes two
arguments and none of them work as your above snippet suggests.
http://git.kernel.org/?p=libs/libcap/libcap.git;a=blob;f=libcap/cap_alloc.c;h=5fa5e9305c146529e297285befa03e7c5521e9ba;hb=HEAD
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(capget, cap_user_header_t, header, cap_user_data_t, dataptr)
165 {
166 int ret = 0;
167 pid_t pid;
168 unsigned tocopy;
169 kernel_cap_t pE, pI, pP;
170
171 ret = cap_validate_magic(header, &tocopy);
172 if (ret != 0)
173 return ret;
ie., two arguments, both of which are pointers. dataptr is not touched
if you supply incorrect magic... The return at line 173 is taken if
header is explored and does not contain the correct magic (ie.
Invalid) - which it overwrites with the kernel-preferred value in the
header, and returns EINVAL...
I don't see an EFAULT problem here.
> Still an error.
Could you clarify? Perhaps with some actual code?
Thanks
Andrew
>
> -Steve
>
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