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Date:	Mon, 23 Nov 2009 09:18:32 +1100 (EST)
From:	James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
To:	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
cc:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
	Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>,
	Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH] security/selinux: Simplify proc inode to security
 label mapping.

On Fri, 20 Nov 2009, Eric W. Biederman wrote:

> 
> Currently selinux has incestuous knowledge of the implementation details
> of procfs and sysctl that it uses to get a pathname from an inode. As it
> happens the point we care is in the security_d_instantiate lsm hook so
> we have a valid dentry that we can use to get the entire pathname on
> the proc filesystem.  With the recent change to sys_sysctl to go through
> proc/sys all proc and sysctl accesses go through the vfs, which
> means we no longer need a sysctl special case.

I need to investigate this further, but one immediate issue is that 
Tomoyo seems to have similar code.


> So get the path for the dentry, remove the incestuous knowledge
> and simplify the code.
> 
> caveat: Because the dentry may not yet be hashed I think dentry_path will
>         append (deleted) and thus is not the right function to call.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
> ---
>  security/selinux/hooks.c |  114 ++++-----------------------------------------
>  1 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 103 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index bb230d5..37ed36e 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -43,7 +43,6 @@
>  #include <linux/fdtable.h>
>  #include <linux/namei.h>
>  #include <linux/mount.h>
> -#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
>  #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
>  #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
>  #include <linux/tty.h>
> @@ -70,7 +69,6 @@
>  #include <net/ipv6.h>
>  #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
>  #include <linux/personality.h>
> -#include <linux/sysctl.h>
>  #include <linux/audit.h>
>  #include <linux/string.h>
>  #include <linux/selinux.h>
> @@ -1178,39 +1176,27 @@ static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protoc
>  }
>  
>  #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
> -static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
> +static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
>  				u16 tclass,
>  				u32 *sid)
>  {
> -	int buflen, rc;
> -	char *buffer, *path, *end;
> +	int rc;
> +	char *buffer, *path;
>  
>  	buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
>  	if (!buffer)
>  		return -ENOMEM;
>  
> -	buflen = PAGE_SIZE;
> -	end = buffer+buflen;
> -	*--end = '\0';
> -	buflen--;
> -	path = end-1;
> -	*path = '/';
> -	while (de && de != de->parent) {
> -		buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
> -		if (buflen < 0)
> -			break;
> -		end -= de->namelen;
> -		memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
> -		*--end = '/';
> -		path = end;
> -		de = de->parent;
> -	}
> -	rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
> +	path = dentry_path(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
> +	if (IS_ERR(path))
> +		rc = PTR_ERR(path);
> +	else
> +		rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
>  	free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
>  	return rc;
>  }
>  #else
> -static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
> +static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
>  				u16 tclass,
>  				u32 *sid)
>  {
> @@ -1374,10 +1360,9 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
>  		isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
>  
>  		if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
> -			struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
> -			if (proci->pde) {
> +			if (opt_dentry) {
>  				isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
> -				rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
> +				rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(opt_dentry,
>  							  isec->sclass,
>  							  &sid);
>  				if (rc)
> @@ -1939,82 +1924,6 @@ static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
>  	return task_has_capability(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
>  }
>  
> -static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
> -{
> -	int buflen, rc;
> -	char *buffer, *path, *end;
> -
> -	rc = -ENOMEM;
> -	buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
> -	if (!buffer)
> -		goto out;
> -
> -	buflen = PAGE_SIZE;
> -	end = buffer+buflen;
> -	*--end = '\0';
> -	buflen--;
> -	path = end-1;
> -	*path = '/';
> -	while (table) {
> -		const char *name = table->procname;
> -		size_t namelen = strlen(name);
> -		buflen -= namelen + 1;
> -		if (buflen < 0)
> -			goto out_free;
> -		end -= namelen;
> -		memcpy(end, name, namelen);
> -		*--end = '/';
> -		path = end;
> -		table = table->parent;
> -	}
> -	buflen -= 4;
> -	if (buflen < 0)
> -		goto out_free;
> -	end -= 4;
> -	memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
> -	path = end;
> -	rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
> -out_free:
> -	free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
> -out:
> -	return rc;
> -}
> -
> -static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
> -{
> -	int error = 0;
> -	u32 av;
> -	u32 tsid, sid;
> -	int rc;
> -
> -	sid = current_sid();
> -
> -	rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
> -				    SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
> -	if (rc) {
> -		/* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
> -		tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
> -	}
> -
> -	/* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
> -	 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
> -	if (op == 001) {
> -		error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
> -				     SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
> -	} else {
> -		av = 0;
> -		if (op & 004)
> -			av |= FILE__READ;
> -		if (op & 002)
> -			av |= FILE__WRITE;
> -		if (av)
> -			error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
> -					     SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
> -	}
> -
> -	return error;
> -}
> -
>  static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
>  {
>  	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
> @@ -5457,7 +5366,6 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
>  	.ptrace_traceme =		selinux_ptrace_traceme,
>  	.capget =			selinux_capget,
>  	.capset =			selinux_capset,
> -	.sysctl =			selinux_sysctl,
>  	.capable =			selinux_capable,
>  	.quotactl =			selinux_quotactl,
>  	.quota_on =			selinux_quota_on,
> -- 
> 1.6.5.2.143.g8cc62
> 

-- 
James Morris
<jmorris@...ei.org>
--
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