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Message-ID: <hhioce$j9t$2@taverner.cs.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 31 Dec 2009 17:52:14 +0000 (UTC)
From: daw@...berkeley.edu (David Wagner)
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH v3] Unprivileged: Disable raising of privileges
Alan Cox wrote:
>Look up the sendmail security archive and you'll even find examples where
>enforcing extra security on setuid *caused* security problems to show up
>that were basically impossible to hit otherwise.
Yes, we know: people have mentioned the sendmail bug multiple times
in this thread. That's exactly the hazard that this proposed patch
was intended to help address. That's exactly the hazard that all
this discussion has been focused on.
This patch is not a security model. It may facilitate other
security models, hopefully, but it's not intended as a security
model in itself.
>We have a security system, with a set of interfaces for attaching
>security models, please stop trying to go round the back of the kernel
>design because you can't be bothered to do the required work to do the
>job right and would rather add more unmaintainable crap all over the
>place.
Got a constructive suggestion for a better way to implement this?
My impression is that all thread participants have been happy to
listen to constructive suggestions about alternative ways to achieve
the goals, from people who have payed attention to the discussion and
taken the time to understand the points that havee been raised so far.
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