[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.2.00.1001110929310.25601@tundra.namei.org>
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2010 09:58:52 +1100 (EST)
From: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
To: Michael Stone <michael@...top.org>
cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>, David Lang <david@...g.hm>,
Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@...tkopp.net>,
Alan Cox <alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
Valdis Kletnieks <Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu>,
Bryan Donlan <bdonlan@...il.com>,
Evgeniy Polyakov <zbr@...emap.net>,
"C. Scott Ananian" <cscott@...ott.net>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Bernie Innocenti <bernie@...ewiz.org>,
Mark Seaborn <mrs@...hic-beasts.com>,
Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@...cle.com>,
Américo Wang <xiyou.wangcong@...il.com>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>,
Samir Bellabes <sam@...ack.fr>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@...ibm.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/3] Security: Implement disablenetwork semantics. (v4)
On Sun, 10 Jan 2010, Michael Stone wrote:
>
> Pavel's position is that disablenetwork is likely to permit some attacker
> somewhere to deny network access to some setuid app some day in a way that
> violates some security policy.
>
> He has mentioned specific concern over scenarios like:
>
> Alice configures PAM auth to 'fail open' by checking login credentials
> against a restrictive LDAP server and, if the server is unavailable, against
> a very permissive files database.
>
> Alice updates her kernel to a version with disablenetwork.
>
> Mallory calls disablenetwork, calls su -, and vanquishes all.
>
> My position is that better isolation facilities like disablenetwork will
> prevent far more grievous security faults than they (theoretically) cause.
>
> What is your perspective on the matter?
Unexpected failure modes for privileged apps using security interfaces has
already proven to be a problem (e.g. the sendmail capabilities bug), so it
seems prudent to try and mitigate that as well. I don't think we need to
look at this as an either-or situation -- it seems we can do both, and get
something useful in its own right from the mitigation.
--
James Morris
<jmorris@...ei.org>
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists