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Message-ID: <20100112061058.GA5231@heat>
Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2010 01:10:58 -0500
From: Michael Stone <michael@...top.org>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@...ibm.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>, David Lang <david@...g.hm>,
Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@...tkopp.net>,
Alan Cox <alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
Valdis Kletnieks <Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu>,
Bryan Donlan <bdonlan@...il.com>,
Evgeniy Polyakov <zbr@...emap.net>,
"C. Scott Ananian" <cscott@...ott.net>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Bernie Innocenti <bernie@...ewiz.org>,
Mark Seaborn <mrs@...hic-beasts.com>,
Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@...cle.com>,
Américo Wang <xiyou.wangcong@...il.com>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>,
Samir Bellabes <sam@...ack.fr>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>, Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>,
Kyle Moffett <kyle@...fetthome.net>,
Michael Stone <michael@...top.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/3] Security: Implement disablenetwork semantics. (v4)
Serge Hallyn wrote:
> Michael, I'm sorry, I should go back and search the thread for the
> answer, but don't have time right now - do you really need
> disablenetwork to be available to unprivileged users?
Rainbow can only drop the networking privileges when we know at app launch time
(e.g. based on a manifest or from the human operator) that privileges can be
dropped. Unfortunately, most of the really interesting uses of disablenetwork
happen *after* rainbow has dropped privilege and handed control the app.
Therefore, having an API which can be used by at least some low-privilege
processes is important to me.
> is it ok to require CAP_SETPCAP (same thing required for dropping privs from
> bounding set)?
Let me try to restate your idea:
We can make disablenetwork safer by permitting its use only where explicitly
permitted by some previously privileged ancestor. The securebits facility
described in
http://lwn.net/Articles/280279/
may be a good framework in which to implement this control.
Did I understand correctly? If so, then yes, this approach seems like it would
work for me.
Regards, and thanks very much for your help,
Michael
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