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Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2010 01:10:58 -0500 From: Michael Stone <michael@...top.org> To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@...ibm.com> Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>, David Lang <david@...g.hm>, Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@...tkopp.net>, Alan Cox <alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>, Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>, Valdis Kletnieks <Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu>, Bryan Donlan <bdonlan@...il.com>, Evgeniy Polyakov <zbr@...emap.net>, "C. Scott Ananian" <cscott@...ott.net>, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>, Bernie Innocenti <bernie@...ewiz.org>, Mark Seaborn <mrs@...hic-beasts.com>, Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@...cle.com>, Américo Wang <xiyou.wangcong@...il.com>, Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>, Samir Bellabes <sam@...ack.fr>, Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>, Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>, Kyle Moffett <kyle@...fetthome.net>, Michael Stone <michael@...top.org> Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/3] Security: Implement disablenetwork semantics. (v4) Serge Hallyn wrote: > Michael, I'm sorry, I should go back and search the thread for the > answer, but don't have time right now - do you really need > disablenetwork to be available to unprivileged users? Rainbow can only drop the networking privileges when we know at app launch time (e.g. based on a manifest or from the human operator) that privileges can be dropped. Unfortunately, most of the really interesting uses of disablenetwork happen *after* rainbow has dropped privilege and handed control the app. Therefore, having an API which can be used by at least some low-privilege processes is important to me. > is it ok to require CAP_SETPCAP (same thing required for dropping privs from > bounding set)? Let me try to restate your idea: We can make disablenetwork safer by permitting its use only where explicitly permitted by some previously privileged ancestor. The securebits facility described in http://lwn.net/Articles/280279/ may be a good framework in which to implement this control. Did I understand correctly? If so, then yes, this approach seems like it would work for me. Regards, and thanks very much for your help, Michael -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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