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Message-ID: <20100114150039.GB6322@us.ibm.com>
Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2010 09:00:39 -0600
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@...ibm.com>
To: Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>
Cc: Michael Stone <michael@...top.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
netdev@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>, David Lang <david@...g.hm>,
Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@...tkopp.net>,
Alan Cox <alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
Valdis Kletnieks <Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu>,
Bryan Donlan <bdonlan@...il.com>,
Evgeniy Polyakov <zbr@...emap.net>,
"C. Scott Ananian" <cscott@...ott.net>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Bernie Innocenti <bernie@...ewiz.org>,
Mark Seaborn <mrs@...hic-beasts.com>,
Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@...cle.com>,
Am?rico Wang <xiyou.wangcong@...il.com>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>,
Samir Bellabes <sam@...ack.fr>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>,
Kyle Moffett <kyle@...fetthome.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/3] Security: Implement disablenetwork semantics. (v4)
Quoting Pavel Machek (pavel@....cz):
> > Quoting Michael Stone (michael@...top.org):
> > > Serge Hallyn wrote:
> > > >Michael, I'm sorry, I should go back and search the thread for the
> > > >answer, but don't have time right now - do you really need
> > > >disablenetwork to be available to unprivileged users?
> > >
> > > Rainbow can only drop the networking privileges when we know at app launch time
> > > (e.g. based on a manifest or from the human operator) that privileges can be
> > > dropped. Unfortunately, most of the really interesting uses of disablenetwork
> > > happen *after* rainbow has dropped privilege and handed control the app.
> > > Therefore, having an API which can be used by at least some low-privilege
> > > processes is important to me.
> > >
> > > >is it ok to require CAP_SETPCAP (same thing required for dropping privs from
> > > >bounding set)?
> > >
> > > Let me try to restate your idea:
> > >
> > > We can make disablenetwork safer by permitting its use only where explicitly
> > > permitted by some previously privileged ancestor. The securebits facility
> > > described in
> > >
> > > http://lwn.net/Articles/280279/
> > >
> > > may be a good framework in which to implement this control.
> > >
> > > Did I understand correctly? If so, then yes, this approach seems like it would
> > > work for me.
> >
> > That is a little more than I was saying this time though I think I
> > suggested it earlier.
> >
> > But really I don't think anyone would care to separate a system into
> > some processes allowed to do unprivileged disablenetwork and other
> > processes not allowed to, so a (root-owned mode 644) sysctl seems just
> > as useful.
>
> Global solution like that is always wrong. (And we have better
> solution available.)
All right, so Michael suggested securebits, I personally feel prctl would
be more appropriate, but in any case the suggestion then is:
foo_enable_disablenet() is either prctl(PR_ALLOW_DISABLENET) or
prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, (1 << PR_ALLOW_DISABLENET) | (1 << PR_ALLOW_DISABLENET_LOCK))
and it requires privilege (CAP_NET_ADMIN presumably) to make this call.
prctl(PR_SET_DISABLENETWORK), or whatever Michael was using, does not
require privilege, but requires that foo_enable_disablenet() have been
previously called by a privileged app.
-serge
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