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Message-ID: <4B5455FF.7010409@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2010 14:37:19 +0200
From: Avi Kivity <avi@...hat.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
CC: ananth@...ibm.com, Jim Keniston <jkenisto@...ibm.com>,
Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...radead.org>,
utrace-devel <utrace-devel@...hat.com>,
Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@...il.com>,
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...hat.com>,
Maneesh Soni <maneesh@...ibm.com>,
Mark Wielaard <mjw@...hat.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC] [PATCH 1/7] User Space Breakpoint Assistance Layer (UBP)
On 01/18/2010 02:14 PM, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
>
>> Well, the alternatives are very unappealing. Emulation and
>> single-stepping are going to be very slow compared to a couple of jumps.
>>
> With CPL2 or RPL on user segments the protection issue seems to be
> manageable for running the instructions from kernel space.
>
CPL2 gives unrestricted access to the kernel address space; and RPL does
not affect page level protection. Segment limits don't work on x86-64.
But perhaps I missed something - these things are tricky.
It should be possible to translate the instruction into an address space
check, followed by the action, but that's still slower due to privilege
level switches.
--
error compiling committee.c: too many arguments to function
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