[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20100221020144.GV30031@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Date: Sun, 21 Feb 2010 02:01:44 +0000
From: Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>
To: Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@...redi.hu>, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Eugene Teo <eugene@...hat.com>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com>,
Bodo Eggert <7eggert@....de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] vfs: add NOFOLLOW flag to umount(2)
On Thu, Feb 11, 2010 at 12:21:00PM -0500, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 10, 2010 at 12:15:53PM +0100, Miklos Szeredi wrote:
> > - renamed flag to UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW
> > - added UMOUNT_UNUSED for feature detection
>
> Umm, why? MNT_ certainly isn't the best naming for unmount flags,
> but switching convention after we had a few doesn't make any sense.
Actually, I've got more interesting question: what's being attempted
there? Is that just a "let's protect ourselves against somebody feeding
us an untrusted symlink"? I'm not sure if it makes much sense; if we
are dealing with pathnames on untrusted fs, there's nothing to stop the
attacker from having /mnt/foo/dir (originally containing a mountpoint
at /mnt/foo/dir/usr) killed and replaced with a symlink to /, making any
code that does umount() on such pathnames vulnerable as hell anyway.
Lack of LOOKUP_FOLLOW affects only the last pathname component. So what
is that patch trying to make safe?
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists