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Message-ID: <m2eijxqps5.fsf@ssh.synack.fr>
Date: Sat, 06 Mar 2010 19:16:26 +0100
From: Samir Bellabes <sam@...ack.fr>
To: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
netfilter-devel@...r.kernel.org, hadi@...erus.ca, kaber@...sh.net,
zbr@...emap.net, nhorman@...driver.com, root@...aldomain.pl,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC v2 00/10] snet: Security for NETwork syscalls
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp> writes:
> Regarding [RFC v2 04/10] snet: introduce snet_core
> +static __init int snet_init(void)
> +{
> + int ret;
> +
> + pr_debug("initializing: event_hash_size=%u "
> + "verdict_hash_size=%u verdict_delay=%usecs "
> + "default_policy=%s\n",
> + snet_evh_size, snet_vdh_size, snet_verdict_delay,
> + snet_verdict_name(snet_verdict_policy));
>
> Why not to stop here if snet_evh_size == 0 or snet_vdh_size == 0 in order to
> avoid "division by 0".
indeed. I applied this patch
>From 593614c92a1f2058c014fa674c67f434b24b26e4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Samir Bellabes <sam@...ack.fr>
Date: Sat, 6 Mar 2010 17:32:51 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 2/3] snet: adding checks for bad configuration values
this patch adds some checks on boot parameters and runtime configurations for:
- snet_verdict_policy, snet_verdict_delay and snet_vdh_size
- snet_evh_size
- snet_ticket_delay and snet_ticket_mode
Noticed by Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Samir Bellabes <sam@...ack.fr>
---
include/linux/snet.h | 1 +
security/snet/snet_core.c | 6 ++++++
security/snet/snet_event.c | 6 ++++++
security/snet/snet_netlink.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++-------
security/snet/snet_ticket.c | 12 ++++++++++++
security/snet/snet_verdict.c | 12 ++++++++++++
6 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/snet.h b/include/linux/snet.h
index 739601d..e6e2d52 100644
--- a/include/linux/snet.h
+++ b/include/linux/snet.h
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ enum snet_ticket_mode {
SNET_TICKET_OFF = 0,
SNET_TICKET_FIX,
SNET_TICKET_EXTEND,
+ SNET_TICKET_INVALID,
};
/* genetlink commands */
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_core.c b/security/snet/snet_core.c
index 9f2eb2e..949ecaa 100644
--- a/security/snet/snet_core.c
+++ b/security/snet/snet_core.c
@@ -42,6 +42,12 @@ static __init int snet_init(void)
snet_evh_size, snet_vdh_size, snet_verdict_delay,
snet_verdict_name(snet_verdict_policy));
+ if (snet_verdict_policy >= SNET_VERDICT_INVALID) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "snet: bad snet_verdict_policy\n");
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto event_failed;
+ }
+
ret = snet_event_init();
if (ret < 0)
goto event_failed;
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_event.c b/security/snet/snet_event.c
index 5f708d0..5693aac 100644
--- a/security/snet/snet_event.c
+++ b/security/snet/snet_event.c
@@ -165,6 +165,12 @@ int snet_event_init(void)
{
int err = 0, i = 0;
+ if (snet_evh_size == 0) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "snet: bad snet_evh_size value\n");
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
snet_evh = kzalloc(sizeof(struct list_head) * snet_evh_size,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!snet_evh) {
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_netlink.c b/security/snet/snet_netlink.c
index b0dd163..937b0fc 100644
--- a/security/snet/snet_netlink.c
+++ b/security/snet/snet_netlink.c
@@ -363,25 +363,38 @@ out:
static int snet_nl_config(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct genl_info *info)
{
- int ret = -EINVAL;
+ int ret = 0;
atomic_set(&snet_nl_seq, info->snd_seq);
if (info->attrs[SNET_A_VERDICT_DELAY]) {
- snet_verdict_delay = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[SNET_A_VERDICT_DELAY]);
+ unsigned int new = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[SNET_A_VERDICT_DELAY]);
+ if (new == 0) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ snet_verdict_delay = new;
pr_debug("snet_nl_config: verdict_delay=%u\n", snet_verdict_delay);
- ret = 0;
}
if (info->attrs[SNET_A_TICKET_DELAY]) {
- snet_ticket_delay = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[SNET_A_TICKET_DELAY]);
+ unsigned int new = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[SNET_A_TICKET_DELAY]);
+ if (new == 0) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ snet_ticket_delay = new;
pr_debug("snet_nl_config: ticket_delay=%u\n", snet_ticket_delay);
- ret = 0;
}
if (info->attrs[SNET_A_TICKET_MODE]) {
- snet_ticket_mode = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[SNET_A_TICKET_MODE]);
+ unsigned int new = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[SNET_A_TICKET_MODE]);
+ if (new >= SNET_TICKET_INVALID) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ snet_ticket_mode = new;
pr_debug("snet_nl_config: ticket_mode=%u\n", snet_ticket_mode);
- ret = 0;
}
+out:
return ret;
}
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_ticket.c b/security/snet/snet_ticket.c
index 62ced7b..80a1b0f 100644
--- a/security/snet/snet_ticket.c
+++ b/security/snet/snet_ticket.c
@@ -158,6 +158,18 @@ int snet_ticket_init(void)
struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
struct snet_task_security *tsec = NULL;
+ if (snet_ticket_mode >= SNET_TICKET_INVALID) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "snet: bad snet_ticket_mode\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if ((snet_ticket_mode == SNET_TICKET_FIX ||
+ snet_ticket_mode == SNET_TICKET_EXTEND) &&
+ (snet_ticket_delay == 0)) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "snet: bad snet_ticket_delay\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct snet_task_security), GFP_KERNEL);
if (tsec == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_verdict.c b/security/snet/snet_verdict.c
index 480a7f8..ba35d19 100644
--- a/security/snet/snet_verdict.c
+++ b/security/snet/snet_verdict.c
@@ -156,6 +156,18 @@ int snet_verdict_init(void)
{
int err = 0, i = 0;
+ if (snet_vdh_size == 0) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "snet: bad snet_vdh_size value\n");
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (snet_verdict_delay == 0) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "snet: bad snet_verdict_delay value\n");
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
snet_vdh = kzalloc(sizeof(struct list_head) * snet_vdh_size,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!snet_vdh) {
--
1.6.3.3
--
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