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Message-ID: <alpine.LFD.2.00.1003081107200.3989@localhost.localdomain> Date: Mon, 8 Mar 2010 11:15:13 -0800 (PST) From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org> To: Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk> cc: Alan Cox <alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Kyle McMartin <kyle@...artin.ca>, Alexander Viro <viro@....linux.org.uk> Subject: Re: Upstream first policy On Mon, 8 Mar 2010, Linus Torvalds wrote: > > Sure, there is content security. Nobody disputes that. The security > decision about how to open a file is about the contents of the file. Btw, I would also say that content security is generally the _common_ case. So I'm not at all saying that the traditional unix model or the selinux model is in any way "wrong". Not at all. It's just that I certainly understand why some people think AppArmor is more "intuitive". And I think it's directly related to the fact that sometimes the pathname-based approach is the one that more directly reflects the particular issue (and people are often happy with the traditional UNIX semantics for plain inode-based security, so again, it's not like AppArmor _replaces_ inode-based security, it _extends_ on it). Linus -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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