linux-kernel - Re: Upstream first policy

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Date:	Mon, 8 Mar 2010 11:15:13 -0800 (PST)
From:	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
To:	Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>
cc:	Alan Cox <alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>,
	James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	Kyle McMartin <kyle@...artin.ca>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@....linux.org.uk>
Subject: Re: Upstream first policy

On Mon, 8 Mar 2010, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> 
> Sure, there is content security. Nobody disputes that. The security 
> decision about how to open a file is about the contents of the file.

Btw, I would also say that content security is generally the _common_ 
case. So I'm not at all saying that the traditional unix model or the 
selinux model is in any way "wrong". Not at all.

It's just that I certainly understand why some people think AppArmor is 
more "intuitive". And I think it's directly related to the fact that 
sometimes the pathname-based approach is the one that more directly 
reflects the particular issue (and people are often happy with the 
traditional UNIX semantics for plain inode-based security, so again, it's 
not like AppArmor _replaces_ inode-based security, it _extends_ on it).

			Linus

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