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Message-ID: <4BAA3323.9000405@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2010 17:43:31 +0200
From: Avi Kivity <avi@...hat.com>
To: Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>
CC: "Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange@...hat.com>,
Anthony Liguori <anthony@...emonkey.ws>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@...helsinki.fi>,
"Zhang, Yanmin" <yanmin_zhang@...ux.intel.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@...llo.nl>,
Sheng Yang <sheng@...ux.intel.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@...hat.com>,
Jes Sorensen <Jes.Sorensen@...hat.com>,
Gleb Natapov <gleb@...hat.com>, ziteng.huang@...el.com,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...hat.com>,
Fr?d?ric Weisbecker <fweisbec@...il.com>,
Gregory Haskins <ghaskins@...ell.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC] Unify KVM kernel-space and user-space code into a single
project
On 03/24/2010 05:37 PM, Joerg Roedel wrote:
>
>> No it can't. With sVirt every single VM has a custom security label and
>> the policy only allows it access to disks / files with a matching label,
>> and prevents it attacking any other VMs or processes on the host. THis
>> confines the scope of any exploit in QEMU to those resources the admin
>> has explicitly assigned to the guest.
>>
> Even better. So a guest which breaks out can't even access its own
> /sys/kvm/ directory. Perfect, it doesn't need that access anyway.
>
>
But what security label does that directory have? How can we make sure
that whoever needs access to those files, gets them?
Automatically created objects don't work well with that model. They're
simply missing information.
--
error compiling committee.c: too many arguments to function
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