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Message-ID: <20100409113029.GB2994@localhost.localdomain>
Date: Fri, 9 Apr 2010 19:30:29 +0800
From: wzt.wzt@...il.com
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, jmorris@...ei.org
Subject: [PATCH] Security: Fix coding style in security/
Fix coding style in security/
Signed-off-by: Zhitong Wang <zhitong.wangzt@...baba-inc.com>
---
security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
security/selinux/ss/mls.c | 2 +-
security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 4 +-
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 12 +++++-----
4 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index cd191bb..0293843 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -503,11 +503,11 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_access(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
return length;
length = -ENOMEM;
- scon = kzalloc(size+1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ scon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!scon)
return length;
- tcon = kzalloc(size+1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ tcon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tcon)
goto out;
@@ -515,10 +515,10 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_access(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
goto out2;
- length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon)+1, &ssid);
+ length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid);
if (length < 0)
goto out2;
- length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon)+1, &tsid);
+ length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid);
if (length < 0)
goto out2;
@@ -550,11 +550,11 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
return length;
length = -ENOMEM;
- scon = kzalloc(size+1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ scon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!scon)
return length;
- tcon = kzalloc(size+1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ tcon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tcon)
goto out;
@@ -562,10 +562,10 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
goto out2;
- length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon)+1, &ssid);
+ length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid);
if (length < 0)
goto out2;
- length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon)+1, &tsid);
+ length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid);
if (length < 0)
goto out2;
@@ -609,11 +609,11 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_relabel(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
return length;
length = -ENOMEM;
- scon = kzalloc(size+1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ scon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!scon)
return length;
- tcon = kzalloc(size+1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ tcon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tcon)
goto out;
@@ -621,10 +621,10 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_relabel(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
goto out2;
- length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon)+1, &ssid);
+ length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid);
if (length < 0)
goto out2;
- length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon)+1, &tsid);
+ length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid);
if (length < 0)
goto out2;
@@ -666,11 +666,11 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_user(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
return length;
length = -ENOMEM;
- con = kzalloc(size+1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ con = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!con)
return length;
- user = kzalloc(size+1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ user = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!user)
goto out;
@@ -678,7 +678,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_user(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s", con, user) != 2)
goto out2;
- length = security_context_to_sid(con, strlen(con)+1, &sid);
+ length = security_context_to_sid(con, strlen(con) + 1, &sid);
if (length < 0)
goto out2;
@@ -727,11 +727,11 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_member(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
return length;
length = -ENOMEM;
- scon = kzalloc(size+1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ scon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!scon)
return length;
- tcon = kzalloc(size+1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ tcon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tcon)
goto out;
@@ -739,10 +739,10 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_member(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
goto out2;
- length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon)+1, &ssid);
+ length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid);
if (length < 0)
goto out2;
- length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon)+1, &tsid);
+ length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid);
if (length < 0)
goto out2;
@@ -1401,7 +1401,7 @@ static int sel_make_perm_files(char *objclass, int classvalue,
}
inode->i_fop = &sel_perm_ops;
/* i+1 since perm values are 1-indexed */
- inode->i_ino = sel_perm_to_ino(classvalue, i+1);
+ inode->i_ino = sel_perm_to_ino(classvalue, i + 1);
d_add(dentry, inode);
}
@@ -1489,7 +1489,7 @@ static int sel_make_classes(void)
goto out;
/* +2 since classes are 1-indexed */
- last_class_ino = sel_class_to_ino(nclasses+2);
+ last_class_ino = sel_class_to_ino(nclasses + 2);
for (i = 0; i < nclasses; i++) {
struct dentry *class_name_dir;
@@ -1506,7 +1506,7 @@ static int sel_make_classes(void)
goto out1;
/* i+1 since class values are 1-indexed */
- rc = sel_make_class_dir_entries(classes[i], i+1,
+ rc = sel_make_class_dir_entries(classes[i], i + 1,
class_name_dir);
if (rc)
goto out1;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
index 372b773..b4eff7a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ int mls_context_to_sid(struct policydb *pol,
if (!pol->mls_enabled) {
if (def_sid != SECSID_NULL && oldc)
- *scontext += strlen(*scontext)+1;
+ *scontext += strlen(*scontext) + 1;
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index 23c6e53..c956458 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ static int roles_init(struct policydb *p)
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out_free_role;
}
- key = kmalloc(strlen(OBJECT_R)+1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ key = kmalloc(strlen(OBJECT_R) + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!key) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out_free_role;
@@ -2195,7 +2195,7 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
rangetr_hash_eval(p->range_tr);
}
- p->type_attr_map = kmalloc(p->p_types.nprim*sizeof(struct ebitmap), GFP_KERNEL);
+ p->type_attr_map = kmalloc(p->p_types.nprim * sizeof(struct ebitmap), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p->type_attr_map)
goto bad;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index cf27b3e..0b44f5a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -274,15 +274,15 @@ static int constraint_expr_eval(struct context *scontext,
case CEXPR_AND:
BUG_ON(sp < 1);
sp--;
- s[sp] &= s[sp+1];
+ s[sp] &= s[sp + 1];
break;
case CEXPR_OR:
BUG_ON(sp < 1);
sp--;
- s[sp] |= s[sp+1];
+ s[sp] |= s[sp + 1];
break;
case CEXPR_ATTR:
- if (sp == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH-1))
+ if (sp == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH - 1))
return 0;
switch (e->attr) {
case CEXPR_USER:
@@ -1216,7 +1216,7 @@ static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
*sid = SECSID_NULL;
/* Copy the string so that we can modify the copy as we parse it. */
- scontext2 = kmalloc(scontext_len+1, gfp_flags);
+ scontext2 = kmalloc(scontext_len + 1, gfp_flags);
if (!scontext2)
return -ENOMEM;
memcpy(scontext2, scontext, scontext_len);
@@ -2101,9 +2101,9 @@ int security_get_user_sids(u32 fromsid,
ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&user->roles, rnode, i) {
role = policydb.role_val_to_struct[i];
- usercon.role = i+1;
+ usercon.role = i + 1;
ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&role->types, tnode, j) {
- usercon.type = j+1;
+ usercon.type = j + 1;
if (mls_setup_user_range(fromcon, user, &usercon))
continue;
--
1.6.5.3
--
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