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Message-ID: <n2ncb0375e11004200811x830e2047o6da43d6d3d85058@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 2010 11:11:55 -0400
From: Andrew Lutomirski <luto@....edu>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@...ibm.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
Eric Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
"Andrew G. Morgan" <morgan@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/3] Taming execve, setuid, and LSMs
On Tue, Apr 20, 2010 at 10:35 AM, Serge E. Hallyn <serue@...ibm.com> wrote:
>>
>> True, but I think it's still asking for trouble -- other LSMs could
>> (and almost certainly will, especially the out-of-tree ones) do
>> something, and I think that any action at all that an LSM takes in the
>> bprm_set_creds hook for a nosuid (or whatever it's called) process is
>> wrong or at best misguided.
>
> I could be wrong, but I think the point is that your reasoning is
> correct, and that the same reasoning must apply if we're just
> executing a file out of an fs which has been mounted with '-o nosuid'.
I tend to agree, except that only root can set nosuid (presumably) and
making that change will change existing behavior. Is that a problem?
--Andy
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