linux-kernel - [11/98] core, x86: make LIST

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Date:	Mon, 10 May 2010 15:34:23 -0700
From:	Greg KH <gregkh@...e.de>
To:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...nel.org
Cc:	stable-review@...nel.org, torvalds@...ux-foundation.org,
	akpm@...ux-foundation.org, alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk,
	Jaswinder Singh Rajput <jaswinderrajput@...il.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>, Avi Kivity <avi@...hat.com>
Subject: [11/98] core, x86: make LIST_POISON less deadly

2.6.32-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------

From: Avi Kivity <avi@...ranet.com>

commit a29815a333c6c6e677294bbe5958e771d0aad3fd upstream.

The list macros use LIST_POISON1 and LIST_POISON2 as undereferencable
pointers in order to trap erronous use of freed list_heads.  Unfortunately
userspace can arrange for those pointers to actually be dereferencable,
potentially turning an oops to an expolit.

To avoid this allow architectures (currently x86_64 only) to override
the default values for these pointers with truly-undereferencable values.
This is easy on x86_64 as the virtual address space is large and contains
areas that cannot be mapped.

Other 64-bit architectures will likely find similar unmapped ranges.

[ingo: switch to 0xdead000000000000 as the unmapped area]
[ingo: add comments, cleanup]
[jaswinder: eliminate sparse warnings]

Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaswinder Singh Rajput <jaswinderrajput@...il.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@...hat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...e.de>

---
 arch/x86/Kconfig       |    5 +++++
 include/linux/poison.h |   16 ++++++++++++++--
 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1236,6 +1236,11 @@ config ARCH_MEMORY_PROBE
 	def_bool X86_64
 	depends on MEMORY_HOTPLUG
 
+config ILLEGAL_POINTER_VALUE
+       hex
+       default 0 if X86_32
+       default 0xdead000000000000 if X86_64
+
 source "mm/Kconfig"
 
 config HIGHPTE
--- a/include/linux/poison.h
+++ b/include/linux/poison.h
@@ -2,13 +2,25 @@
 #define _LINUX_POISON_H
 
 /********** include/linux/list.h **********/
+
+/*
+ * Architectures might want to move the poison pointer offset
+ * into some well-recognized area such as 0xdead000000000000,
+ * that is also not mappable by user-space exploits:
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_ILLEGAL_POINTER_VALUE
+# define POISON_POINTER_DELTA _AC(CONFIG_ILLEGAL_POINTER_VALUE, UL)
+#else
+# define POISON_POINTER_DELTA 0
+#endif
+
 /*
  * These are non-NULL pointers that will result in page faults
  * under normal circumstances, used to verify that nobody uses
  * non-initialized list entries.
  */
-#define LIST_POISON1  ((void *) 0x00100100)
-#define LIST_POISON2  ((void *) 0x00200200)
+#define LIST_POISON1  ((void *) 0x00100100 + POISON_POINTER_DELTA)
+#define LIST_POISON2  ((void *) 0x00200200 + POISON_POINTER_DELTA)
 
 /********** include/linux/timer.h **********/
 /*


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