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Message-ID: <20100602140155.GE11162@8bytes.org>
Date: Wed, 2 Jun 2010 16:01:55 +0200
From: Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>
To: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@...hat.com>
Cc: Avi Kivity <avi@...hat.com>, Tom Lyon <pugs@...co.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
chrisw@...s-sol.org, hjk@...utronix.de, gregkh@...e.de,
aafabbri@...co.com, scofeldm@...co.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] VFIO driver: Non-privileged user level PCI drivers
On Wed, Jun 02, 2010 at 04:17:19PM +0300, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 02, 2010 at 02:50:50PM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> > On Wed, Jun 02, 2010 at 03:25:11PM +0300, Avi Kivity wrote:
> > > On 06/02/2010 03:19 PM, Joerg Roedel wrote:
>
> > If its
> > required anyway the binding can happen implicitly. We could allow to do
> > a nop 'ioctl(dev1, SHARE, dev1)' to remove the asymmetry.
>
> And then when we assign meaning to it we find that half the apps
> are broken because they did not call this ioctl.
The meaning is already assigned and chaning it means changing the
userspace-abi which is a no-go.
> This simple scenario ignores all the real-life corner cases.
> For example, with an explicit iommu open and bind application
> can naturally detect that:
> - we have run out of iommu domains
ioctl(dev, MAP, ...) will fail in this case.
> - iommu is unsupported
Is best checked by open() anyway because userspace can't do anything
with the device before it is bound to a domain.
> - iommu is in use by another, incompatible device
How should this happen?
> - device is in bad state
How is this checked with your proposal and why can this not be detected
with my one?
> because each is a separate operation, so it is easy to produce meaningful
> errors.
Ok, this is true.
> Another interesting thing that a separate iommu device supports is when
> application A controls the iommu and application B
> controls the device.
Until Linux becomes a micro-kernel the IOMMU itself will _never_ be
controlled by an application.
> This might be good to e.g. improve security (B is run by root, A is
> unpriveledged and passes commands to/from B over a pipe).
Micro-kernel arguments. I hope a userspace controlled IOMMU in Linux
will never happen ;-)
Joerg
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