linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 00/14] EVM

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Date:	Wed, 02 Jun 2010 10:03:00 +0300
From:	Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...ia.com>
To:	ext Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
CC:	Shaz <shazalive@...il.com>, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
	"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	"linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org" 
	<linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
	David Safford <safford@...son.ibm.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...radead.org>,
	securityengineeringresearchgroup 
	<securityengineeringresearchgroup@...glegroups.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/14] EVM



On 01/06/10 22:28, ext Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Mon, 2010-05-31 at 15:08 +0500, Shaz wrote:
>   
>>> EVM is based on EA while Aegis does not use EA as far as I can
>>> understand from the documentation available. Can we make EVM
>>> independent of EA? Even the MAC mechanism is very different then
>>> existing LSM based mechanisms.
>>>       
>> Have a look at the following:
>>
>> http://research.nokia.com/files/NRCTR2008010.pdf
>> http://research.nokia.com/files/NRCTR2008007.pdf
>> http://lwn.net/Articles/372937/
>>     
> SELinux, Smack, Capabilities, and IMA all use extended attributes. The
> purpose of EVM is to detect offline tampering of these security extended
> attributes.
>
> The IMA integrity appraisal extension extends IMA with local measurement
> appraisal. The extension stores and maintains the file integrity
> measurement as an extended attribute 'security.ima', which EVM can be
> configured to protect.  Instead of storing the hash measurement as an
> extended attribute, the file hashes could be loaded in kernel memory, as
> long as the appraise policy is appropriately constrained.
>
>   
Hi,

Maemo integrity protection solution was based on old DigSig project
which was used to verify
integrity of executables. Signed integrity measurement was embedded to
the ELF header.
When we started to develop it EVM was not available.

And we decided to use a file to keep hashes and other info.

Our goals were
1. Protect also certain data files.
digsig worked only with ELF files.

2. Be mobile friendly
It seems faster to verify signature of one file with hashes instead of
checking signature of every EA.

3. Persistant to offline attacks
EA can be delete. If not all files has EA then it is not possible to
detect removal

4. Do not use EA.
IIRC it was some problems with EA on our system and we could not use them..


EVM looks very interesting and I would like also to review the code and
understand the architecture.
We consider possibility to use EVM if it is going to be in the kernel.

- Dmitry Kasatkin
Maemo/MeeGo security team

> Mimi
>
>
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