linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] ptrace: allow restriction of ptrace scope

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Message-ID: <4C1C2A07.8020007@schaufler-ca.com>
Date:	Fri, 18 Jun 2010 19:23:03 -0700
From:	Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
To:	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
CC:	Theodore Tso <tytso@....EDU>, Alan Cox <alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
	Kees Cook <kees.cook@...onical.com>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...otime.net>,
	James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>,
	Dave Young <hidave.darkstar@...il.com>,
	Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@...ibm.com>,
	Roland McGrath <roland@...hat.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
	David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>,
	Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@...llo.nl>,
	linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
	Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh@...hat.com>,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] ptrace: allow restriction of ptrace scope

Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> Theodore Tso <tytso@....EDU> writes:
>
>   
>> i think we really need to have stacked LSM's,

!

>>  because there is a large set
>> of people who will never use SELinux.  Every few years, I take another 
>> look at SELinux, my head explodes with the (IMHO unneeded complexity),
>> and I go away again...
>>
>> Yet I would really like a number of features such as this ptrace scope idea ---
>> which I think is a useful feature, and it may be that stacking is the only
>> way we can resolve this debate.   The SELinux people will never believe that
>> their system is too complicated, and I don't like using things that are impossible
>> for me to understand or configure, and that doesn't seem likely to change anytime
>> in the near future.
>>
>> I mean, even IPSEC RFC's are easier for me to understand, and that's saying
>> a lot...
>>     
>
>
> If anyone is going to work on this let me make a concrete suggestion.
> Let's aim at not stacked lsm's but chained lsm's, and put the chaining
> logic in the lsm core.
>   

It's 35 years since my data structures course. What's the important
difference between the two?

> The core difficulty appears to be how do you multiplex the security pointers
> on various objects out there.
>   

That and making sure that the hooks that maintain state get called
even if the decision to deny access has already been made by someone
else.

> My wishlist has this working so that I can logically have a local security
> policy in a container, restricted by the global policy but with additional
> restrictions.
>
> Eric
> --
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>   

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