linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2] sanitize task->comm to avoid leaking escape codes

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-Id: <20100630092432.3900.A69D9226@jp.fujitsu.com>
Date:	Wed, 30 Jun 2010 09:28:08 +0900 (JST)
From:	KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@...fujitsu.com>
To:	Steve Grubb <sgrubb@...hat.com>
Cc:	kosaki.motohiro@...fujitsu.com,
	Stefani Seibold <stefani@...bold.net>,
	Kees Cook <kees.cook@...onical.com>,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	"Greg Kroah-Hartman" <gregkh@...e.de>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>,
	Veaceslav Falico <vfalico@...hat.com>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
	Neil Horman <nhorman@...driver.com>,
	Roland McGrath <roland@...hat.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>,
	Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@...llo.nl>,
	Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@...fujitsu.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
	Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
	"Andrew G. Morgan" <morgan@...nel.org>,
	Dhaval Giani <dhaval.giani@...il.com>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@...ibm.com>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@....de>, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] sanitize task->comm to avoid leaking escape codes

> On Tuesday, June 29, 2010 08:16:08 pm KOSAKI Motohiro wrote:
> > > For the audit system, we want the real, unsanitized task->comm. We record
> > > it  in a special format to the audit logs such that unprintable
> > > characters are included. We want it exactly this way for certification
> > > purposes as well as forensic evidence if someone was playing games. If
> > > you do sanitize it for other areas of the kernel, please give us a way
> > > to get the unsanitized text.
> > 
> > Probably this mail is offtopic. I think audit is unrelated with this
> > discusstion. because when  forensic, admins shouldn't believe task->comm
> > at all. because 1) no path information, perhaps "ls" might mean
> > "/home/attackers-dir/evil-script/ls" 2) easily obscured by
> > prctl(PR_SET_NAME).
> 
> No, its on-topic and we want that information unchanged.

Why?
I think I've described why admins should't see task->comm during forensic. Do you
disagree this? or Do you have another viewpoint?

Can you help us clarify your point?

> > That said, audit have to logged following two point if task name is
> > necessary. 1) exec
> > 2) prctl(PRT_SET_NAME)
> > 
> > Thought ?
> 
> The audit system is capable of grabbing that information, too.

ok. thanks good information :)


--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/