linux-kernel - [PATCH -V16 04/12] vfs: Allow handle based open on symlinks

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Date:	Mon, 12 Jul 2010 12:05:37 +0530
From:	"Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To:	hch@...radead.org, viro@...iv.linux.org.uk, adilger@....com,
	corbet@....net, neilb@...e.de, npiggin@...e.de,
	hooanon05@...oo.co.jp, bfields@...ldses.org
Cc:	linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, sfrench@...ibm.com,
	philippe.deniel@....FR, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	"Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
Subject: [PATCH -V16 04/12] vfs: Allow handle based open on symlinks

The patch update may_open to allow handle based open on symlinks.
The file handle based API use file descritor returned from open_by_handle_at
to do different file system operations. To find the link target name we
need to get a file descriptor on symlinks.

We should be able to read the link target using file handle. The exact
usecase is with respect to implementing READLINK operation on a
userspace NFS server. The request contain the file handle and the
response include target name.

Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 fs/namei.c         |   10 +++++++++-
 fs/open.c          |    9 ++++++++-
 include/linux/fs.h |    1 +
 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 4d590a3..a6a8093 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -1456,7 +1456,15 @@ int may_open(struct path *path, int acc_mode, int flag)
 
 	switch (inode->i_mode & S_IFMT) {
 	case S_IFLNK:
-		return -ELOOP;
+		/*
+		 * Allow only if acc_mode contain
+		 * open link request and read request.
+		 */
+		if (acc_mode != (MAY_OPEN_LINK | MAY_READ))
+			return -ELOOP;
+		if (flag != O_RDONLY)
+			return -ELOOP;
+		break;
 	case S_IFDIR:
 		if (acc_mode & MAY_WRITE)
 			return -EISDIR;
diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
index df5d21e..afb089e 100644
--- a/fs/open.c
+++ b/fs/open.c
@@ -1268,8 +1268,15 @@ static long do_sys_open_by_handle(int mountdirfd,
 	 */
 	if (open_flag & __O_SYNC)
 		open_flag |= O_DSYNC;
+	/*
+	 * Handle based API allow open on a symlink
+	 */
+	if (S_ISLNK(path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode))
+		acc_mode = MAY_OPEN_LINK;
+	else
+		acc_mode = MAY_OPEN;
 
-	acc_mode = MAY_OPEN | ACC_MODE(open_flag);
+	acc_mode |= ACC_MODE(open_flag);
 
 	/* O_TRUNC implies we need access checks for write permissions */
 	if (open_flag & O_TRUNC)
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index a458b4e..08afa72 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ struct inodes_stat_t {
 #define MAY_APPEND 8
 #define MAY_ACCESS 16
 #define MAY_OPEN 32
+#define MAY_OPEN_LINK 64
 
 /*
  * flags in file.f_mode.  Note that FMODE_READ and FMODE_WRITE must correspond
-- 
1.7.2.rc1

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