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Message-ID: <20100714061845.GW6104@outflux.net>
Date: Tue, 13 Jul 2010 23:18:45 -0700
From: Kees Cook <kees.cook@...onical.com>
To: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2] Yama: verify inode is symlink to avoid bind mounts
The inode_follow_link LSM hook is called in bind mount situations as
well as for symlink situations, so we must explicitly check for the
inode being a symlink to not reject bind mounts in 1777 directories,
which seems to be a common NFSv4 configuration.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@...onical.com>
---
v2:
- actually set inode in time to use it. *face palm*
---
security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 6 +++++-
1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
index 3b76386..51c6a3a 100644
--- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
+++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
@@ -116,9 +116,13 @@ static int yama_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry,
if (!protected_sticky_symlinks)
return 0;
+ /* if inode isn't a symlink, don't try to evaluate blocking it */
+ inode = dentry->d_inode;
+ if (!S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode))
+ return 0;
+
/* owner and follower match? */
cred = current_cred();
- inode = dentry->d_inode;
if (cred->fsuid == inode->i_uid)
return 0;
--
1.7.1
--
Kees Cook
Ubuntu Security Team
--
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