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Message-ID: <4C4A5985.6000206@austin.ibm.com>
Date:	Fri, 23 Jul 2010 22:09:57 -0500
From:	Nathan Fontenot <nfont@...tin.ibm.com>
To:	Dave Hansen <dave@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
CC:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
	linuxppc-dev@...abs.org,
	KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@...fujitsu.com>,
	greg@...ah.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/8] v3 Allow memory_block to span multiple memory sections

On 07/20/2010 02:18 PM, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On Mon, 2010-07-19 at 22:55 -0500, Nathan Fontenot wrote:
>> +static int add_memory_section(int nid, struct mem_section *section,
>> +                       unsigned long state, enum mem_add_context context)
>> +{
>> +       struct memory_block *mem;
>> +       int ret = 0;
>> +
>> +       mem = find_memory_block(section);
>> +       if (mem) {
>> +               atomic_inc(&mem->section_count);
>> +               kobject_put(&mem->sysdev.kobj);
>> +       } else
>> +               ret = init_memory_block(&mem, section, state);
>> +
>>         if (!ret) {
>> -               if (context == HOTPLUG)
>> +               if (context == HOTPLUG &&
>> +                   atomic_read(&mem->section_count) == sections_per_block)
>>                         ret = register_mem_sect_under_node(mem, nid);
>>         } 
> 
> I think the atomic_inc() can race with the atomic_dec_and_test() in
> remove_memory_block().
> 
> Thread 1 does:
> 
> 	mem = find_memory_block(section);
> 
> Thread 2 does 
> 
> 	atomic_dec_and_test(&mem->section_count);
> 
> and destroys the memory block,  Thread 1 runs again:
> 	
>        if (mem) {
>                atomic_inc(&mem->section_count);
>                kobject_put(&mem->sysdev.kobj);
>        } else
> 
> but now mem got destroyed by Thread 2.  You probably need to change
> find_memory_block() to itself take a reference, and to use
> atomic_inc_unless().
> 

You're right but I think the fix you suggested will narrow the window for the
race condition, not eliminate it.  We could still take a time splice in
find_memory_block prior to the container_of() calls to get the memory
block pointer and end up de-referencing a invalid kobject o sysdev pointer.

I think if we want to eliminate this we may need to have lock that protects
access to any of the memory_block structures.  This would need to be taken
any time find_memory_block is called and released when use of the memory_block
returned is finished.  If we're going to fix this we should eliminate the
window completely instead of just closing it further.

If we add a lock should I submit it as part of this patchset? or submit it
as a follow-on?

-Nathan 
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