Date:	Tue, 03 Aug 2010 23:52:30 +0200
From:	Christian Stroetmann <stroetmann@...olinux.com>
To:	Kees Cook <kees.cook@...onical.com>,
	Al Viro <viro@....linux.org.uk>
CC:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
	linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>,
	James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu
Subject: Re: Preview of changes to the Security susbystem for 2.6.36

Hello everybody;
On the 03.08.2010 18:50, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 02, 2010 at 02:51:13PM -0400, Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu wrote:
>    
>> On Mon, 02 Aug 2010 09:59:36 PDT, Kees Cook said:
>>      
>>>> Al gave you some very clear advice how a the sticky check should be
>>>>          
>>> This is patently false. "Very clear advice" would have included actionable
>>> instructions. He (and everyone else) has ignored my requests for
>>> clarification[2]. If you see how the check should be implemented, please
>>> send a patch demonstrating how. I would greatly prefer having these
>>> protections in the VFS itself.
>>>        
>> You're overlooking step zero of Al's advice: First, *think* about the issue
>> in a deep fashion, rather than a knee-jerk patch to fix one instance of
>> the problem.
>>      
> I think this is unfair. This solution has been used for 15 years in other
> hardened kernel patches. It's not knee-jerk at all. Not fixing this is not
> getting the "good" for the sake of wanting the "perfect".
>
>    
>> The problem is that although your patch closes *one set* of symlink attacks
>> that has been traditionally a problem, it doesn't do a very good job of
>> creating a conceptual model and then *really* dealing with the issue. That's
>> the big distinction between SELinux, Tomoyo, Smack, and your proposal - they
>> form a *model* of what's important to protect, and what actions need to be
>> taken to *actually* protect them.  They don't just apply one arbitrary rule
>> that closes some attacks - they make an honest effort to deal with all
>> variants of the attack, and other attacks that allow bypass, and so on.
>>      
> Okay, thanks for this explanation of why people don't want Yama as an LSM.
> I disagree with the logic, but at least I understand the reasoning now.
> "Since Yama does not provide a security model, it cannot be an LSM." This
> then leaves a gap for people wanting to make small changes to the logic of
> how the kernel works without resorting to endlessly carrying a patchset.
>
>    

I would say it in a different way:
"Since Yama has as a security model a container that is field with 
functionality of other security packages that have a security model but 
are no LSMs, then instead of making a new LSM like Yama the LSM 
architecture should be overworked to make the whole security packages 
and implicitly their security models LSMs."

>> The reason people are worried that this might grow into a "large" LSM is that
>> quite often, throwing in a bunch of ad-hoc rules may create *apparent*
>> security, but not provide any *real* security.  You yourself admit that Yama
>>      
>    

To be honest, I don't think this is a reason. The reason I see is that a 
"large" LSM consisting of a thrown in bunch of ad-hoc rules
may rule the structure of the security model of LSMs.

> I can accept this as a theoretical position, but it's not like I've
> suddenly invented some new unproven protection. Given a choice between
> fighting to have it be an LSM and fighting to have it in the VFS, I prefer
> the VFS, since I'm trying to fix a flaw in DAC.
>
>    

But it was discussed that it should become at least an LSM. And it was 
found out that:
1. No new unproven protections have been invented.
2. The functionalities/features were taken out of other security 
packages that are no LSMs but (seem to) have a security model.
3. The question was not answered if the functionalities/features could 
be done by already existing LSMs (eg. SELinux).

>> only closes one set of symlink attacks without addressing the general issue of
>> symlinks, hard links, TOCTOU races, and a lot of *other* similar "the file you
>> actually opened is not the one you intended to open" attacks. And the reason it
>> doesn't address the general issue is because it lacks a security model.  And
>> the reason you're having so much trouble getting it into the tree is because if
>> you're going to apply this at either the VFS or LSM layers, you need to address
>> the *general* problem and not one ad-hoc variant of it.
>>      
> Well, here we disagree. DAC is flawed, this fixes a giant class of security
> problems. The model is "fix what sticky means for symlinks" and "fix when
> hardlinks are created". :P
>
>    
>> And quite frankly, the idea of this morphing into a "large" LSM containing a
>> lot of ad-hoc rules scares most security people, because without a good
>> conceptual model, it's hard to define if the security is in fact working, or
>> what the problem is if it isn't working.
>>      
> I have regression tests for all the Yama features. I can prove if it's
> working or not.
>
>    

That's out of context. The context was if the whole conceptual model 
with all of its features is working and not if every single feature of 
Yama is working.

>>> I've seen two so far. Both are addressed with a one line fix. And I would
>>> stress that no other existing subsystem in the kernel can provide the same
>>> level of control that my ptrace exception logic provides. SELinux cannot do
>>> this.
>>>        
>> Quick question: Now is that "SELinux doesn't consider the added granularity
>> important and doesn't bother doing it", or "SELinux can't do it *currently*",
>> or "there are innate structural reasons why SELinux is by design unable to do
>> it"?  Note that it's a big difference, and it's dangerous for your cause to
>> bring it up without understanding which it is, and why...
>>      
> I don't know the answer to this, but other people I've asked have said they
> didn't think it was possible. I would tend to agree since it requires an
> explicit action from the debugee.
>
> MAC is system-owner defined. This is programmer defined. I want my program
> to be able to declare that a single specific pid can PTRACE it and nothing
> else. Another example of programmer defined access control would be the
> ability to "give up" access to syscalls, a finer-grained version of
> SECCOMP.
>
>    
>> You were told to go back and form an actual *security model*. What's important
>> to protect? What attacks can be made against it? What syscalls are included in
>> the forseeable attacks (hint - probably more than you think - if you're
>> mediating symlink access, a bit of thought will show symlinks aren't the only
>> problem you need to worry about to *actually* secure the resource).
>>      
> Cross-uid symlink following and cross-permission hardlink creation are
> flaws in DAC that lead to a large persistent class of ToCToU
> vulnerabilities that are trivially avoidable. It's been fixed for 15 years.
> I'm not exactly sure how to model this. We've discussed how shared /tmp is
> one aspect of the problem, but it's not the entire problem. We've discussed
> how per-user /tmp is untenable in the short-term, etc. This is a way to get
> there now while per-user /tmp is slowly adopted over the next 15 years.
>
> -Kees
>
>    

Have fun
Christian Stroetmann
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