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Message-ID: <4C860255.7000707@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 07 Sep 2010 12:13:57 +0300
From: Avi Kivity <avi@...hat.com>
To: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@...il.com>
CC: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>, Pekka Enberg <penberg@...helsinki.fi>,
Tom Zanussi <tzanussi@...il.com>,
Frédéric Weisbecker <fweisbec@...il.com>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...hat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
linux-perf-users@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: disabling group leader perf_event
On 09/07/2010 11:33 AM, Stefan Hajnoczi wrote:
>
> Native Client: A Sandbox for Portable, Untrusted x86 Native Code, IEEE
> Symposium on Security and Privacy, May 2009
> http://nativeclient.googlecode.com/svn/data/docs_tarball/nacl/googleclient/native_client/documentation/nacl_paper.pdf
>
> The "Inner Sandbox" they talk about verifies a subset of x86 code.
> For indirect control flow (computed jumps), they introduce a new
> instruction that can do run-time checking of the destination address.
Interesting, but appears to rely on x86 segmentation, which isn't
available on x86_64.
Removing that requirement means replacing indirect memory access by a
new instruction that does run-time checking, like indirect control flow,
which is likely to kill performance.
--
error compiling committee.c: too many arguments to function
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