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Message-ID: <4CA65D0E.6080604@hp.com>
Date: Fri, 01 Oct 2010 18:13:34 -0400
From: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@...com>
To: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@...curity.com>
CC: sri@...ibm.com, linux-sctp@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, security@...nel.org,
stable@...nel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Fix out-of-bounds reading in sctp_asoc_get_hmac()
On 10/01/2010 05:51 PM, Dan Rosenberg wrote:
> The sctp_asoc_get_hmac() function iterates through a peer's hmac_ids
> array and attempts to ensure that only a supported hmac entry is
> returned. The current code fails to do this properly - if the last id
> in the array is out of range (greater than SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_MAX), the
> id integer remains set after exiting the loop, and the address of an
> out-of-bounds entry will be returned and subsequently used in the parent
> function, causing potentially ugly memory corruption. This patch resets
> the id integer to 0 on encountering an invalid id so that NULL will be
> returned after finishing the loop if no valid ids are found.
>
> Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg<drosenberg@...curity.com>
Good catch.
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@...com>
-vlad
>
> --- linux-2.6.35.5.orig/net/sctp/auth.c 2010-09-20 16:59:09.000000000 -0400
> +++ linux-2.6.35.5/net/sctp/auth.c 2010-10-01 16:48:58.000000000 -0400
> @@ -543,16 +543,20 @@ struct sctp_hmac *sctp_auth_asoc_get_hma
> id = ntohs(hmacs->hmac_ids[i]);
>
> /* Check the id is in the supported range */
> - if (id> SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_MAX)
> + if (id> SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_MAX) {
> + id = 0;
> continue;
> + }
>
> /* See is we support the id. Supported IDs have name and
> * length fields set, so that we can allocated and use
> * them. We can safely just check for name, for without the
> * name, we can't allocate the TFM.
> */
> - if (!sctp_hmac_list[id].hmac_name)
> + if (!sctp_hmac_list[id].hmac_name) {
> + id = 0;
> continue;
> + }
>
> break;
> }
>
>
--
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