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Message-Id: <1289230246-3856-4-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 2010 10:30:45 -0500
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, keyrings@...ux-nfs.org,
linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@...idianresearch.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
David Safford <safford@...son.ibm.com>,
Rajiv Andrade <srajiv@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ibm.com>
Subject: [PATCH v1.2 3/4] keys: add new trusted key-type
Defines a new kernel key-type called 'trusted'. Trusted keys are
random number symmetric keys, generated and RSA-sealed by the TPM.
The TPM only unseals the keys, if the boot PCRs and other criteria
match. Userspace can only ever see encrypted blobs.
Based on suggestions by Jason Gunthorpe, several new options have
been added to support additional usages.
The new options are:
migratable= designates that the key may/may not ever be updated
(resealed under a new key, new pcrinfo or new auth.)
pcrlock=n extends the designated PCR 'n' with a random value,
so that a key sealed to that PCR may not be unsealed
again until after a reboot.
keyhandle= specifies the sealing/unsealing key handle.
keyauth= specifies the sealing/unsealing key auth.
blobauth= specifies the sealed data auth.
Implementation of a kernel reserved locality for trusted keys
will be investigated for a possible future extension.
Changelog:
- New options: migratable, pcrlock, keyhandle, keyauth, blobauth (based on
discussions with Jason Gunthorpe)
- Free payload on failure to create key(reported/fixed by Roberto Sassu)
- Updated Kconfig and other descriptions (based on Serge Hallyn's suggestion)
- Replaced kzalloc() with kmalloc() (reported by Serge Hallyn)
Signed-off-by: David Safford <safford@...son.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ibm.com>
---
include/keys/trusted-type.h | 32 ++
security/Kconfig | 15 +
security/keys/Makefile | 1 +
security/keys/trusted_defined.c | 1096 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/keys/trusted_defined.h | 147 ++++++
5 files changed, 1291 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 include/keys/trusted-type.h
create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted_defined.c
create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted_defined.h
diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5c3a158
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+/* trusted-type.h: trusted-defined key type
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation
+ * Author: David Safford <safford@...ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _KEYS_TRUSTED_TYPE_H
+#define _KEYS_TRUSTED_TYPE_H
+
+#include <linux/key.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+
+#define MIN_KEY_SIZE 32
+#define MAX_KEY_SIZE 128
+#define MAX_BLOB_SIZE 320
+
+struct trusted_key_payload {
+ struct rcu_head rcu; /* RCU destructor */
+ unsigned int key_len;
+ unsigned int blob_len;
+ unsigned char migratable;
+ unsigned char key[MAX_KEY_SIZE+1];
+ unsigned char blob[MAX_BLOB_SIZE];
+};
+
+extern struct key_type key_type_trusted;
+
+#endif /* _KEYS_TRUSTED_TYPE_H */
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index bd72ae6..415422e 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -21,6 +21,21 @@ config KEYS
If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
+config TRUSTED_KEYS
+ tristate "TRUSTED KEYS"
+ depends on KEYS && TCG_TPM
+ select CRYPTO
+ select CRYPTO_HMAC
+ select CRYPTO_SHA1
+ help
+ This option provides support for creating, sealing, and unsealing
+ keys in the kernel. Trusted keys are random number symmetric keys,
+ generated and RSA-sealed by the TPM. The TPM only unseals the keys,
+ if the boot PCRs and other criteria match. Userspace can only ever
+ see encrypted blobs.
+
+ If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
+
config KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS
bool "Enable the /proc/keys file by which keys may be viewed"
depends on KEYS
diff --git a/security/keys/Makefile b/security/keys/Makefile
index 74d5447..fcb1070 100644
--- a/security/keys/Makefile
+++ b/security/keys/Makefile
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ obj-y := \
request_key_auth.o \
user_defined.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted_defined.o
obj-$(CONFIG_KEYS_COMPAT) += compat.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PROC_FS) += proc.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL) += sysctl.o
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted_defined.c b/security/keys/trusted_defined.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a16a63f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/trusted_defined.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1096 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Author:
+ * David Safford <safford@...ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
+ *
+ * Defines a new kernel key-type called 'trusted'. Trusted keys are random
+ * number symmetric keys, generated and RSA-sealed by the TPM. The TPM only
+ * unseals the keys, if the boot PCRs and other criteria match. Userspace
+ * can only ever see encrypted blobs.
+ *
+ * By default, trusted keys are sealed with the Storage Root Key (SRK).
+ * The SRK usage authorization value is the well-known value of 20 zeroes.
+ * This can be set at takeownership time with the trouser's utility
+ * "tpm_takeownership -u -z".
+ *
+ * Usage:
+ * keyctl add trusted name "new keylen [options]" ring
+ * keyctl update key "update [options]"
+ * keyctl add trusted name "load hex_blob [pcrlock=pcrnum]" ring
+ * keyctl print keyid
+ *
+ * options:
+ * keyhandle= ascii hex value of sealing key
+ * default 0x40000000 (SRK)
+ * keyauth= ascii hex auth for sealing key
+ * default 0x00... (40 ascii zeros)
+ * blobauth= ascii hex auth for sealed data
+ * default 0x00... (40 ascii zeros)
+ * pcrinfo= ascii hex of PCR_INFO or PCR_INFO_LONG
+ * (no default - create with genpcrinfo util)
+ * pcrlock= pcr number to be extended to "lock" blob
+ * migratable= 0|1 indicating permission to reseal to new PCR values
+ * default 1 (resealing allowed)
+ *
+ * keys can be 32 - 128 bytes, blob max is 1024 hex ascii characters
+ * binary pcrinfo max is 512 hex ascii characters
+ */
+
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/parser.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <keys/user-type.h>
+#include <keys/trusted-type.h>
+#include <linux/key-type.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
+#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <linux/tpm.h>
+
+#include "trusted_defined.h"
+
+static char hmac_alg[] = "hmac(sha1)";
+static char hash_alg[] = "sha1";
+
+static int init_sha1_desc(struct hash_desc *desc)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ desc->tfm = crypto_alloc_hash(hash_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+ if (IS_ERR(desc->tfm)) {
+ rc = PTR_ERR(desc->tfm);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ desc->flags = 0;
+ rc = crypto_hash_init(desc);
+ if (rc)
+ crypto_free_hash(desc->tfm);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int init_hmac_desc(struct hash_desc *desc, unsigned char *key,
+ int keylen)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ desc->tfm = crypto_alloc_hash(hmac_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+ if (IS_ERR(desc->tfm)) {
+ rc = PTR_ERR(desc->tfm);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ desc->flags = 0;
+ crypto_hash_setkey(desc->tfm, key, keylen);
+ rc = crypto_hash_init(desc);
+ if (rc)
+ crypto_free_hash(desc->tfm);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int TSS_sha1(unsigned char *data, int datalen, unsigned char *digest)
+{
+ struct hash_desc desc;
+ struct scatterlist sg[1];
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = init_sha1_desc(&desc);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+
+ sg_init_one(sg, data, datalen);
+ rc = crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, datalen);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto out;
+ rc = crypto_hash_final(&desc, digest);
+out:
+ crypto_free_hash(desc.tfm);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int TSS_rawhmac(unsigned char *digest, unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int keylen, ...)
+{
+ struct hash_desc desc;
+ struct scatterlist sg[1];
+ unsigned int dlen;
+ unsigned char *data;
+ va_list argp;
+ int error;
+
+ error = init_hmac_desc(&desc, key, keylen);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+
+ va_start(argp, keylen);
+ for (;;) {
+ dlen = (unsigned int)va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
+ if (dlen == 0)
+ break;
+ data = (unsigned char *)va_arg(argp, unsigned char *);
+ if (data == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ sg_init_one(sg, data, dlen);
+ error = crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, dlen);
+ if (error < 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ error = crypto_hash_final(&desc, digest);
+ crypto_free_hash(desc.tfm);
+
+ va_end(argp);
+ return error;
+}
+
+/*
+ * calculate authorization info fields to send to TPM
+ */
+static uint32_t TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *digest, unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int keylen, unsigned char *h1,
+ unsigned char *h2, unsigned char h3, ...)
+{
+ unsigned char paramdigest[TPM_HASH_SIZE];
+ struct hash_desc desc;
+ struct scatterlist sg[1];
+ unsigned int dlen;
+ unsigned char *data;
+ unsigned char c;
+ int rc;
+
+ va_list argp;
+
+ rc = init_sha1_desc(&desc);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+ c = h3;
+ va_start(argp, h3);
+ for (;;) {
+ dlen = (unsigned int)va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
+ if (dlen == 0)
+ break;
+ data = (unsigned char *)va_arg(argp, unsigned char *);
+ sg_init_one(sg, data, dlen);
+ rc = crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, dlen);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ va_end(argp);
+ rc = crypto_hash_final(&desc, paramdigest);
+ crypto_free_hash(desc.tfm);
+ TSS_rawhmac(digest, key, keylen, TPM_HASH_SIZE, paramdigest,
+ TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h1, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h2, 1, &c, 0, 0);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * verify the AUTH1_COMMAND (Seal) result from TPM
+ */
+static uint32_t TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer, uint32_t command,
+ unsigned char *ononce, unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int keylen, ...)
+{
+ uint32_t bufsize;
+ uint16_t tag;
+ uint32_t ordinal;
+ uint32_t result;
+ unsigned char *enonce;
+ unsigned char *continueflag;
+ unsigned char *authdata;
+ unsigned char testhmac[TPM_HASH_SIZE];
+ unsigned char paramdigest[TPM_HASH_SIZE];
+ struct hash_desc desc;
+ struct scatterlist sg[1];
+ unsigned int dlen;
+ unsigned int dpos;
+ va_list argp;
+ int rc;
+
+ bufsize = LOAD32(buffer, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET);
+ tag = LOAD16(buffer, 0);
+ ordinal = command;
+ result = LOAD32N(buffer, TPM_RETURN_OFFSET);
+
+ if (tag == TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND)
+ return 0;
+ if (tag != TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND)
+ return -1;
+ authdata = buffer + bufsize - TPM_HASH_SIZE;
+ continueflag = authdata - 1;
+ enonce = continueflag - TPM_NONCE_SIZE;
+ rc = init_sha1_desc(&desc);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+ sg_init_one(sg, &result, TPM_U32_SIZE);
+ crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, TPM_U32_SIZE);
+ sg_init_one(sg, &ordinal, TPM_U32_SIZE);
+ crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, TPM_U32_SIZE);
+ va_start(argp, keylen);
+ for (;;) {
+ dlen = (unsigned int)va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
+ if (dlen == 0)
+ break;
+ dpos = (unsigned int)va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
+ sg_init_one(sg, buffer + dpos, dlen);
+ rc = crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, dlen);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ va_end(argp);
+ crypto_hash_final(&desc, paramdigest);
+ crypto_free_hash(desc.tfm);
+
+ TSS_rawhmac(testhmac, key, keylen, TPM_HASH_SIZE, paramdigest,
+ TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce,
+ TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 1, continueflag, 0, 0);
+ if (memcmp(testhmac, authdata, TPM_HASH_SIZE) != 0)
+ return -1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * verify the AUTH2_COMMAND (unseal) result from TPM
+ */
+static uint32_t TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer, uint32_t command,
+ unsigned char *ononce, unsigned char *key1,
+ unsigned int keylen1, unsigned char *key2,
+ unsigned int keylen2, ...)
+{
+ uint32_t bufsize;
+ uint16_t tag;
+ uint32_t ordinal;
+ uint32_t result;
+ unsigned char *enonce1;
+ unsigned char *continueflag1;
+ unsigned char *authdata1;
+ unsigned char *enonce2;
+ unsigned char *continueflag2;
+ unsigned char *authdata2;
+ unsigned char testhmac1[TPM_HASH_SIZE];
+ unsigned char testhmac2[TPM_HASH_SIZE];
+ unsigned char paramdigest[TPM_HASH_SIZE];
+ struct hash_desc desc;
+ struct scatterlist sg[1];
+ unsigned int dlen;
+ unsigned int dpos;
+ va_list argp;
+ int rc;
+
+ bufsize = LOAD32(buffer, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET);
+ tag = LOAD16(buffer, 0);
+ ordinal = command;
+ result = LOAD32N(buffer, TPM_RETURN_OFFSET);
+
+ if (tag == TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND)
+ return 0;
+ if (tag != TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH2_COMMAND)
+ return -1;
+ authdata1 = buffer + bufsize - (TPM_HASH_SIZE + 1
+ + TPM_HASH_SIZE + TPM_HASH_SIZE);
+ authdata2 = buffer + bufsize - (TPM_HASH_SIZE);
+ continueflag1 = authdata1 - 1;
+ continueflag2 = authdata2 - 1;
+ enonce1 = continueflag1 - TPM_NONCE_SIZE;
+ enonce2 = continueflag2 - TPM_NONCE_SIZE;
+
+ rc = init_sha1_desc(&desc);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+ sg_init_one(sg, &result, TPM_U32_SIZE);
+ crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, TPM_U32_SIZE);
+ sg_init_one(sg, &ordinal, TPM_U32_SIZE);
+ crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, TPM_U32_SIZE);
+
+ va_start(argp, keylen2);
+ for (;;) {
+ dlen = (unsigned int)va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
+ if (dlen == 0)
+ break;
+ dpos = (unsigned int)va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
+ sg_init_one(sg, buffer + dpos, dlen);
+ rc = crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, dlen);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ crypto_hash_final(&desc, paramdigest);
+ crypto_free_hash(desc.tfm);
+
+ TSS_rawhmac(testhmac1, key1, keylen1, TPM_HASH_SIZE, paramdigest,
+ TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce1,
+ TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 1, continueflag1, 0, 0);
+ TSS_rawhmac(testhmac2, key2, keylen2, TPM_HASH_SIZE, paramdigest,
+ TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce2,
+ TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 1, continueflag2, 0, 0);
+ if (memcmp(testhmac1, authdata1, TPM_HASH_SIZE) != 0)
+ return -1;
+ if (memcmp(testhmac2, authdata2, TPM_HASH_SIZE) != 0)
+ return -1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * For key specific tpm requests, we will generate and send our
+ * own TPM command packets using the drivers send function.
+ */
+static int trusted_tpm_send(u32 chip_num, unsigned char *cmd, int buflen)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ dump_tpm_buf(cmd);
+ rc = tpm_send(chip_num, cmd, buflen);
+ dump_tpm_buf(cmd);
+ if (rc > 0)
+ /* Can't return positive return codes values to keyctl */
+ rc = -EPERM;
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * get a random value from TPM
+ */
+static int tpm_get_random(struct tpm_buf *tb, unsigned char *buf, uint32_t len)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ INIT_BUF(tb);
+ store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND);
+ store32(tb, TPM_GETRANDOM_SIZE);
+ store32(tb, TPM_ORD_GETRANDOM);
+ store32(tb, len);
+ ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, sizeof tb->data);
+ memcpy(buf, tb->data + TPM_GETRANDOM_RETURN, len);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int my_get_random(unsigned char *buf, int len)
+{
+ struct tpm_buf *tb;
+ int ret;
+
+ tb = kzalloc(sizeof *tb, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tb)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ ret = tpm_get_random(tb, buf, len);
+
+ kfree(tb);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Lock a trusted key, by extending a selected PCR.
+ *
+ * Prevents a trusted key that is sealed to PCRs from being accessed.
+ * This uses the tpm driver's extend function.
+ */
+static int pcrlock(int pcrnum)
+{
+ unsigned char hash[TPM_HASH_SIZE];
+ int ret;
+
+ my_get_random(hash, TPM_HASH_SIZE);
+ ret = tpm_pcr_extend(TPM_ANY_NUM, pcrnum, hash);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create an object specific authorisation protocol (OSAP) session
+ */
+static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s,
+ unsigned char *key, uint16_t type, uint32_t handle)
+{
+ unsigned char enonce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
+ unsigned char ononce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = tpm_get_random(tb, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ INIT_BUF(tb);
+ store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND);
+ store32(tb, TPM_OSAP_SIZE);
+ store32(tb, TPM_ORD_OSAP);
+ store16(tb, type);
+ store32(tb, handle);
+ storebytes(tb, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+
+ ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, TPM_MAX_BUF_SIZE);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ s->handle = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET);
+ memcpy(s->enonce, &(tb->data[TPM_DATA_OFFSET + TPM_U32_SIZE]),
+ TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+ memcpy(enonce, &(tb->data[TPM_DATA_OFFSET + TPM_U32_SIZE +
+ TPM_NONCE_SIZE]), TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+ ret = TSS_rawhmac(s->secret, key, TPM_HASH_SIZE, TPM_NONCE_SIZE,
+ enonce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 0, 0);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create an object independent authorisation protocol (oiap) session
+ */
+static int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t * handle, unsigned char *nonce)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ INIT_BUF(tb);
+ store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND);
+ store32(tb, TPM_OIAP_SIZE);
+ store32(tb, TPM_ORD_OIAP);
+ ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, TPM_MAX_BUF_SIZE);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ *handle = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET);
+ memcpy(nonce, &tb->data[TPM_DATA_OFFSET + TPM_U32_SIZE],
+ TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Have the TPM seal(encrypt) the trusted key, possibly based on
+ * Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs). AUTH1 for sealing key.
+ */
+static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype,
+ uint32_t keyhandle, unsigned char *keyauth,
+ unsigned char *data, uint32_t datalen,
+ unsigned char *blob, uint32_t * bloblen,
+ unsigned char *blobauth,
+ unsigned char *pcrinfo, uint32_t pcrinfosize)
+{
+ struct osapsess sess;
+ unsigned char encauth[TPM_HASH_SIZE];
+ unsigned char pubauth[TPM_HASH_SIZE];
+ unsigned char xorwork[TPM_HASH_SIZE * 2];
+ unsigned char xorhash[TPM_HASH_SIZE];
+ unsigned char nonceodd[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
+ unsigned char cont;
+ uint32_t ordinal;
+ uint32_t pcrsize;
+ uint32_t datsize;
+ int sealinfosize;
+ int encdatasize;
+ int storedsize;
+ int ret;
+ int i;
+
+ ret = osap(tb, &sess, keyauth, keytype, keyhandle);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ dump_sess(&sess);
+
+ /* calculate encrypted authorization value */
+ memcpy(xorwork, sess.secret, TPM_HASH_SIZE);
+ memcpy(xorwork + TPM_HASH_SIZE, sess.enonce, TPM_HASH_SIZE);
+ ret = TSS_sha1(xorwork, TPM_HASH_SIZE * 2, xorhash);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = tpm_get_random(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_SEAL);
+ datsize = htonl(datalen);
+ pcrsize = htonl(pcrinfosize);
+ cont = 0;
+
+ /* encrypt data authorization key */
+ for (i = 0; i < TPM_HASH_SIZE; ++i)
+ encauth[i] = xorhash[i] ^ blobauth[i];
+
+ /* calculate authorization HMAC value */
+ if (pcrinfosize == 0) {
+ /* no pcr info specified */
+ TSS_authhmac(pubauth, sess.secret, TPM_HASH_SIZE,
+ sess.enonce, nonceodd, cont, TPM_U32_SIZE,
+ &ordinal, TPM_HASH_SIZE, encauth,
+ TPM_U32_SIZE, &pcrsize, TPM_U32_SIZE,
+ &datsize, datalen, data, 0, 0);
+ } else {
+ /* pcr info specified */
+ TSS_authhmac(pubauth, sess.secret, TPM_HASH_SIZE,
+ sess.enonce, nonceodd, cont, TPM_U32_SIZE,
+ &ordinal, TPM_HASH_SIZE, encauth,
+ TPM_U32_SIZE, &pcrsize, pcrinfosize,
+ pcrinfo, TPM_U32_SIZE, &datsize, datalen,
+ data, 0, 0);
+ }
+
+ INIT_BUF(tb);
+ store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND);
+ store32(tb, TPM_SEAL_SIZE + pcrinfosize + datalen);
+ store32(tb, TPM_ORD_SEAL);
+ store32(tb, keyhandle);
+ storebytes(tb, encauth, TPM_HASH_SIZE);
+ store32(tb, pcrinfosize);
+ storebytes(tb, pcrinfo, pcrinfosize);
+ store32(tb, datalen);
+ storebytes(tb, data, datalen);
+ store32(tb, sess.handle);
+ storebytes(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+ store8(tb, cont);
+ storebytes(tb, pubauth, TPM_HASH_SIZE);
+
+ ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, TPM_MAX_BUF_SIZE);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ /* calculate the size of the returned Blob */
+ sealinfosize = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET + TPM_U32_SIZE);
+ encdatasize = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET + TPM_U32_SIZE +
+ TPM_U32_SIZE + sealinfosize);
+ storedsize = TPM_U32_SIZE + TPM_U32_SIZE + sealinfosize +
+ TPM_U32_SIZE + encdatasize;
+
+ /* check the HMAC in the response */
+ ret = TSS_checkhmac1(tb->data, ordinal, nonceodd, sess.secret,
+ TPM_HASH_SIZE, storedsize, TPM_DATA_OFFSET, 0, 0);
+
+ /* copy the returned blob to caller */
+ memcpy(blob, tb->data + TPM_DATA_OFFSET, storedsize);
+ *bloblen = storedsize;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * use the AUTH2_COMMAND form of unseal, to authorize both key and blob
+ */
+static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb,
+ uint32_t keyhandle, unsigned char *keyauth,
+ unsigned char *blob, int bloblen,
+ unsigned char *blobauth,
+ unsigned char *data, unsigned int *datalen)
+{
+ unsigned char nonceodd[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
+ unsigned char enonce1[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
+ unsigned char enonce2[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
+ unsigned char authdata1[TPM_HASH_SIZE];
+ unsigned char authdata2[TPM_HASH_SIZE];
+ uint32_t authhandle1 = 0;
+ uint32_t authhandle2 = 0;
+ unsigned char cont = 0;
+ uint32_t ordinal;
+ uint32_t keyhndl;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = oiap(tb, &authhandle1, enonce1);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_info("trusted_key: oiap failed (%d)\n", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ ret = oiap(tb, &authhandle2, enonce2);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_info("trusted_key: oiap failed (%d)\n", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_UNSEAL);
+ keyhndl = htonl(SRKHANDLE);
+ ret = tpm_get_random(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_info("trusted_key: tpm_get_random failed (%d)\n", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ TSS_authhmac(authdata1, keyauth, TPM_NONCE_SIZE,
+ enonce1, nonceodd, cont, TPM_U32_SIZE,
+ &ordinal, bloblen, blob, 0, 0);
+ TSS_authhmac(authdata2, blobauth, TPM_NONCE_SIZE,
+ enonce2, nonceodd, cont, TPM_U32_SIZE,
+ &ordinal, bloblen, blob, 0, 0);
+
+ INIT_BUF(tb);
+ store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH2_COMMAND);
+ store32(tb, TPM_UNSEAL_SIZE + bloblen);
+ store32(tb, TPM_ORD_UNSEAL);
+ store32(tb, keyhandle);
+ storebytes(tb, blob, bloblen);
+ store32(tb, authhandle1);
+ storebytes(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+ store8(tb, cont);
+ storebytes(tb, authdata1, TPM_HASH_SIZE);
+ store32(tb, authhandle2);
+ storebytes(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+ store8(tb, cont);
+ storebytes(tb, authdata2, TPM_HASH_SIZE);
+
+ ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, TPM_MAX_BUF_SIZE);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_info("trusted_key: authhmac failed (%d)\n", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ *datalen = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET);
+ ret = TSS_checkhmac2(tb->data, ordinal, nonceodd,
+ keyauth, TPM_HASH_SIZE,
+ blobauth, TPM_HASH_SIZE,
+ TPM_U32_SIZE, TPM_DATA_OFFSET,
+ *datalen, TPM_DATA_OFFSET + TPM_U32_SIZE, 0, 0);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ pr_info("trusted_key: TSS_checkhmac2 failed (%d)\n", ret);
+ memcpy(data, tb->data + TPM_DATA_OFFSET + TPM_U32_SIZE, *datalen);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Have the TPM seal(encrypt) the symmetric key
+ */
+static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
+ struct trusted_key_options *o)
+{
+ struct tpm_buf *tb;
+ int ret;
+
+ tb = kzalloc(sizeof *tb, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tb)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* include migratable flag at end of sealed key */
+ p->key[p->key_len] = p->migratable;
+
+ ret = tpm_seal(tb, o->keytype, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth,
+ p->key, p->key_len + 1, p->blob, &p->blob_len,
+ o->blobauth, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ pr_info("trusted_key: srkseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
+
+ kfree(tb);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Have the TPM unseal(decrypt) the symmetric key
+ */
+static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
+ struct trusted_key_options *o)
+{
+ struct tpm_buf *tb;
+ int ret;
+
+ tb = kzalloc(sizeof *tb, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tb)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ ret = tpm_unseal(tb, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth, p->blob, p->blob_len,
+ o->blobauth, p->key, &p->key_len);
+ /* pull migratable flag out of sealed key */
+ p->migratable = p->key[p->key_len--];
+
+ if (ret < 0)
+ pr_info("trusted_key: srkunseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
+
+ kfree(tb);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+enum {
+ Opt_err = -1,
+ Opt_new = 1, Opt_load, Opt_update,
+ Opt_keyhandle, Opt_keyauth, Opt_blobauth,
+ Opt_pcrinfo, Opt_pcrlock, Opt_migratable
+};
+
+static match_table_t key_tokens = {
+ {Opt_new, "new"},
+ {Opt_load, "load"},
+ {Opt_update, "update"},
+ {Opt_keyhandle, "keyhandle=%s"},
+ {Opt_keyauth, "keyauth=%s"},
+ {Opt_blobauth, "blobauth=%s"},
+ {Opt_pcrinfo, "pcrinfo=%s"},
+ {Opt_pcrlock, "pcrlock=%s"},
+ {Opt_migratable, "migratable=%s"},
+ {Opt_err, NULL}
+};
+
+/* can have zero or more token= options */
+static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
+ struct trusted_key_options *opt)
+{
+ substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
+ char *p = c;
+ int token;
+ int res;
+ unsigned long handle;
+ unsigned long lock;
+
+ while ((p = strsep(&c, " \t"))) {
+ if ((*p == '\0') || (*p == ' ') || (*p == '\t'))
+ continue;
+ token = match_token(p, key_tokens, args);
+
+ switch (token) {
+ case Opt_pcrinfo:
+ opt->pcrinfo_len = strlen(args[0].from) / 2;
+ if (opt->pcrinfo_len > MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ hex2bin(opt->pcrinfo, args[0].from, opt->pcrinfo_len);
+ break;
+ case Opt_keyhandle:
+ res = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 16, &handle);
+ if (res < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ opt->keytype = SEALKEYTYPE;
+ opt->keyhandle = (uint32_t) handle;
+ break;
+ case Opt_keyauth:
+ if (strlen(args[0].from) != 2 * TPM_HASH_SIZE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ hex2bin(opt->keyauth, args[0].from, TPM_HASH_SIZE);
+ break;
+ case Opt_blobauth:
+ if (strlen(args[0].from) != 2 * TPM_HASH_SIZE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from, TPM_HASH_SIZE);
+ break;
+ case Opt_migratable:
+ if (*args[0].from == '0')
+ pay->migratable = 0;
+ else
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ case Opt_pcrlock:
+ res = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lock);
+ if (res < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ opt->pcrlock = (int)lock;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * datablob_parse - parse the keyctl data and fill in the
+ * payload and options structures
+ *
+ * On success returns 0, otherwise -EINVAL.
+ */
+static int datablob_parse(char *datablob, struct trusted_key_payload *p,
+ struct trusted_key_options *o)
+{
+ substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
+ int ret = -EINVAL;
+ int key_cmd;
+ char *c;
+
+ /* main command */
+ c = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
+ if (!c)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ key_cmd = match_token(c, key_tokens, args);
+ switch (key_cmd) {
+ case Opt_new:
+ /* first argument is key size */
+ c = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
+ if (!c)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ ret = strict_strtol(c, 10, (long *)&p->key_len);
+ if ((ret < 0) || (p->key_len < MIN_KEY_SIZE) ||
+ (p->key_len > MAX_KEY_SIZE))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ ret = getoptions(datablob, p, o);
+ if (ret)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ ret = Opt_new;
+ break;
+ case Opt_load:
+ /* first argument is sealed blob */
+ c = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
+ if (!c)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ p->blob_len = strlen(c) / 2;
+ if (p->blob_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ hex2bin(p->blob, c, p->blob_len);
+ ret = getoptions(datablob, p, o);
+ if (ret)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ ret = Opt_load;
+ break;
+ case Opt_update:
+ /* all arguments are options */
+ ret = getoptions(datablob, p, o);
+ if (ret)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ ret = Opt_update;
+ break;
+ case Opt_err:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void)
+{
+ struct trusted_key_options *options;
+
+ options = kzalloc(sizeof *options, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!options)
+ return options;
+
+ /* set any non-zero defaults */
+ options->keytype = SRKKEYTYPE;
+ options->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE;
+ return options;
+}
+
+static struct trusted_key_payload *trusted_payload_alloc(struct key *key)
+{
+ struct trusted_key_payload *p = NULL;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = key_payload_reserve(key, sizeof *p);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return p;
+ p = kzalloc(sizeof *p, GFP_KERNEL);
+
+ /* migratable by default */
+ p->migratable = 1;
+ return p;
+}
+
+/*
+ * trusted_instantiate - create a new trusted key
+ *
+ * Unseal an existing trusted blob or, for a new key, get a
+ * random key, then seal and create a trusted key-type key,
+ * adding it to the specified keyring.
+ *
+ * On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno.
+ */
+static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data,
+ size_t datalen)
+{
+ struct trusted_key_payload *payload = NULL;
+ struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL;
+ char *datablob;
+ int ret = 0;
+ int key_cmd;
+
+ if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!datablob)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ memcpy(datablob, data, datalen);
+ *(datablob + datalen) = '\0';
+
+ options = trusted_options_alloc();
+ if (!options) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ payload = trusted_payload_alloc(key);
+ if (!payload) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ key_cmd = datablob_parse(datablob, payload, options);
+ if (key_cmd < 0) {
+ ret = key_cmd;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ dump_payload(payload);
+ dump_options(options);
+
+ switch (key_cmd) {
+ case Opt_load:
+ ret = key_unseal(payload, options);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ pr_info("trusted_key: key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
+ break;
+ case Opt_new:
+ ret = my_get_random(payload->key, payload->key_len);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_info("trusted_key: key_create failed (%d)\n", ret);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ret = key_seal(payload, options);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret);
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if (options->pcrlock)
+ pcrlock(options->pcrlock);
+out:
+ kfree(datablob);
+ if (options)
+ kfree(options);
+ if (!ret)
+ rcu_assign_pointer(key->payload.data, payload);
+ else if (payload)
+ kfree(payload);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void trusted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu)
+{
+ struct trusted_key_payload *p;
+
+ p = container_of(rcu, struct trusted_key_payload, rcu);
+ memset(p->key, 0, p->key_len);
+ kfree(p);
+}
+
+/*
+ * trusted_update - reseal an existing key with new PCR values
+ */
+static int trusted_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen)
+{
+ struct trusted_key_payload *p = key->payload.data;
+ struct trusted_key_payload *new_p;
+ struct trusted_key_options *new_o;
+ char *datablob;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (!p->migratable)
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!datablob)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ new_o = trusted_options_alloc();
+ if (!new_o) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ new_p = trusted_payload_alloc(key);
+ if (!new_p) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(datablob, data, datalen);
+ *(datablob + datalen) = '\0';
+ ret = datablob_parse(datablob, new_p, new_o);
+ if (ret != Opt_update) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* copy old key values, and reseal with new pcrs */
+ new_p->migratable = p->migratable;
+ new_p->key_len = p->key_len;
+ memcpy(new_p->key, p->key, p->key_len);
+ dump_payload(p);
+ dump_payload(new_p);
+
+ ret = key_seal(new_p, new_o);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret);
+ kfree(new_p);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (new_o->pcrlock)
+ pcrlock(new_o->pcrlock);
+ rcu_assign_pointer(key->payload.data, new_p);
+ call_rcu(&p->rcu, trusted_rcu_free);
+out:
+ kfree(datablob);
+ if (new_o)
+ kfree(new_o);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * trusted_read - copy the sealed blob data to userspace in hex.
+ * On success, return to userspace the trusted key datablob size.
+ */
+static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char __user * buffer,
+ size_t buflen)
+{
+ struct trusted_key_payload *p;
+ char *ascii_buf;
+ char *bufp;
+ int i;
+
+ p = rcu_dereference_protected(key->payload.data,
+ rwsem_is_locked(&((struct key *)key)->
+ sem));
+ if (!p)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!buffer || buflen <= 0)
+ return 2 * p->blob_len;
+
+ ascii_buf = kmalloc(2 * p->blob_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ascii_buf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ bufp = ascii_buf;
+ for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++)
+ bufp = pack_hex_byte(bufp, p->blob[i]);
+
+ if ((copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, 2 * p->blob_len)) != 0) {
+ kfree(ascii_buf);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+ kfree(ascii_buf);
+ return 2 * p->blob_len;
+}
+
+/*
+ * trusted_destroy - before freeing the key, clear the decrypted data
+ */
+static void trusted_destroy(struct key *key)
+{
+ struct trusted_key_payload *p = key->payload.data;
+
+ if (!p)
+ return;
+ memset(p->key, 0, p->key_len);
+ kfree(key->payload.data);
+}
+
+struct key_type key_type_trusted = {
+ .name = "trusted",
+ .instantiate = trusted_instantiate,
+ .update = trusted_update,
+ .match = user_match,
+ .destroy = trusted_destroy,
+ .describe = user_describe,
+ .read = trusted_read,
+};
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_trusted);
+
+static int __init init_trusted(void)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = register_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void __exit cleanup_trusted(void)
+{
+ unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
+}
+
+module_init(init_trusted);
+module_exit(cleanup_trusted);
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted_defined.h b/security/keys/trusted_defined.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..113e6b7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/trusted_defined.h
@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+#ifndef __TRUSTED_KEY_H
+#define __TRUSTED_KEY_H
+
+#define TPM_MAX_BUF_SIZE 512
+#define TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND 193
+#define TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND 194
+#define TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH2_COMMAND 195
+#define TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND 196
+#define TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND 197
+#define TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH2_COMMAND 198
+#define TPM_NONCE_SIZE 20
+#define TPM_HASH_SIZE 20
+#define TPM_SIZE_OFFSET 2
+#define TPM_RETURN_OFFSET 6
+#define TPM_DATA_OFFSET 10
+#define TPM_U32_SIZE 4
+#define TPM_GETRANDOM_SIZE 14
+#define TPM_GETRANDOM_RETURN 14
+#define TPM_ORD_GETRANDOM 70
+#define TPM_RESET_SIZE 10
+#define TPM_ORD_RESET 90
+#define TPM_OSAP_SIZE 36
+#define TPM_ORD_OSAP 11
+#define TPM_OIAP_SIZE 10
+#define TPM_ORD_OIAP 10
+#define TPM_SEAL_SIZE 87
+#define TPM_ORD_SEAL 23
+#define TPM_ORD_UNSEAL 24
+#define TPM_UNSEAL_SIZE 104
+#define SEALKEYTYPE 1
+#define SRKKEYTYPE 4
+#define SRKHANDLE 0x40000000
+#define TPM_ANY_NUM 0xFFFF
+#define MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE 64
+
+#define LOAD32(buffer, offset) (ntohl(*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset]))
+#define LOAD32N(buffer, offset) (*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset])
+#define LOAD16(buffer, offset) (ntohs(*(uint16_t *)&buffer[offset]))
+
+struct tpm_buf {
+ int len;
+ unsigned char data[TPM_MAX_BUF_SIZE];
+};
+
+#define INIT_BUF(tb) (tb->len = 0)
+
+struct osapsess {
+ uint32_t handle;
+ unsigned char secret[TPM_HASH_SIZE];
+ unsigned char enonce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
+};
+
+struct trusted_key_options {
+ uint16_t keytype;
+ uint32_t keyhandle;
+ unsigned char keyauth[TPM_HASH_SIZE];
+ unsigned char blobauth[TPM_HASH_SIZE];
+ uint32_t pcrinfo_len;
+ unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE];
+ int pcrlock;
+};
+
+#define TPM_DEBUG 0
+
+#if TPM_DEBUG
+static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o)
+{
+ pr_info("trusted_key: sealing key type %d\n", o->keytype);
+ pr_info("trusted_key: sealing key handle %0X\n", o->keyhandle);
+ pr_info("trusted_key: pcrlock %d\n", o->pcrlock);
+ pr_info("trusted_key: pcrinfo %d\n", o->pcrinfo_len);
+ print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "pcrinfo ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+ 16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0);
+}
+
+static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p)
+{
+ pr_info("trusted_key: key_len %d\n", p->key_len);
+ print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "key ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+ 16, 1, p->key, p->key_len, 0);
+ pr_info("trusted_key: bloblen %d\n", p->blob_len);
+ print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "blob ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+ 16, 1, p->blob, p->blob_len, 0);
+ pr_info("trusted_key: migratable %d\n", p->migratable);
+}
+
+static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s)
+{
+ print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "trusted-key: handle ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+ 16, 1, &s->handle, 4, 0);
+ pr_info("trusted-key: secret:\n");
+ print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+ 16, 1, &s->secret, TPM_HASH_SIZE, 0);
+ pr_info("trusted-key: enonce:\n");
+ print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+ 16, 1, &s->enonce, TPM_HASH_SIZE, 0);
+}
+
+static inline void dump_tpm_buf(unsigned char *buf)
+{
+ int len;
+
+ pr_info("\ntrusted-key: tpm buffer\n");
+ len = LOAD32(buf, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET);
+ print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, buf, len, 0);
+}
+#else
+static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o)
+{
+}
+
+static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p)
+{
+}
+
+static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s)
+{
+}
+
+static inline void dump_tpm_buf(unsigned char *buf)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
+static inline void store8(struct tpm_buf *buf, unsigned char value)
+{
+ buf->data[buf->len++] = value;
+}
+
+static inline void store16(struct tpm_buf *buf, uint16_t value)
+{
+ *(uint16_t *) & buf->data[buf->len] = htons(value);
+ buf->len += sizeof(value);
+}
+
+static inline void store32(struct tpm_buf *buf, uint32_t value)
+{
+ *(uint32_t *) & buf->data[buf->len] = htonl(value);
+ buf->len += sizeof(value);
+}
+
+static inline void storebytes(struct tpm_buf *buf, unsigned char *in, int len)
+{
+ memcpy(buf->data + buf->len, in, len);
+ buf->len += len;
+}
+#endif
--
1.7.2.2
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