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Message-ID: <20101108214228.GQ5876@outflux.net>
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 2010 13:42:28 -0800
From: Kees Cook <kees.cook@...onical.com>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
Cc: Siarhei Liakh <sliakh.lkml@...il.com>,
Rusty Russell <rusty@...tcorp.com.au>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...radead.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [Security] proactive defense: using read-only memory, RO/NX
modules
Hi,
On Mon, Nov 08, 2010 at 07:13:24AM +0100, Ingo Molnar wrote:
> * Kees Cook <kees.cook@...onical.com> wrote:
> > While Dan Rosenberg is working to make things harder to locate potential targets
> > in the kernel through fixing kernel address leaks[1], I'd like to approach a
> > related proactive security measure: enforcing read-only memory for things that
> > would make good targets.
>
> Nice! IMHO we need more of that. (If the readonly section gets big enough in
> practice we could perhaps even mark it large-page in the future. It could serve as
> an allocator to module code as well - that would probably be a speedup even for
> modules.)
Well, I can try to extract and send what PaX does, but it seems relatively
incompatible with the existing system that uses set_kernel_text_rw() and
friends.
> > - Modules need to be correctly marked RO/NX. This patch exists[3], but is
> > not in mainline. It needs to be in mainline.
> [...]
> >
> > [3] http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/x86/linux-2.6-tip.git;a=commitdiff;h=65187d24fa3ef60f691f847c792e8eaca7e19251
>
> The reason the RO/NX patch from Siarhei Liakh is not upstream yet is rather mundane:
> it introduced regressions - it caused boot crashes on one of my testboxes.
>
> But there is no fundamental reason why it shouldnt be upstream. We can push it
> upstream if the crashes are resolved and if it gets an Ack from Rusty or Linus for
> the module bits.
Oh, well, yes, that's a good reason. :) Where was this covered? I'd like to
help get it reproduced and ironed out.
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Ubuntu Security Team
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