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Date: Mon, 08 Nov 2010 09:30:50 +0100 From: Bodo Eggert <7eggert@....de> To: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@...curity.com>, security@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC] Restrictions on module loading Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@...curity.com> wrote: > The below patch replaces the existing "modules_disable" sysctl with a > finer-grained "modules_restrict" sysctl. By default, this is set at 0, > which results in no deviation from normal module loading behavior. When > set to 1, unprivileged users cannot trigger the automatic loading of > modules. This behavior is based on grsecurity's GRKERNSEC_MODHARDEN > setting. The current check is against current_uid(), since several > distributions explicitly remove CAP_SYS_MODULE from root processes, some > of which incidentally cause (and rely on) the automatic loading of > modules. I expect this to be a point of discussion. - Why don't you offer both? - What about task switches or work queues? - It might be more like the expected behavior if you'd used: 0: off, 1: modules completely disabled, 2: CAP_SYS_MODULE, 3: uid==0 Many users will forget to look into the documentation or find the current, stale documentation or just assume a boolean value. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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