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Message-Id: <20101110154956.83a3f84d.akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 2010 15:49:56 -0800
From: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
To: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@...curity.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, torvalds@...ux-foundation.org,
mingo@...e.hu, kees.cook@...onical.com, security@...nel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] Restrict unprivileged access to kernel syslog
On Wed, 10 Nov 2010 18:28:55 -0500
Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@...curity.com> wrote:
> The kernel syslog contains debugging information that is often useful
> during exploitation of other vulnerabilities, such as kernel heap
> addresses. Rather than futilely attempt to sanitize hundreds (or
> thousands) of printk statements and simultaneously cripple useful
> debugging functionality, it is far simpler to create an option that
> prevents unprivileged users from reading the syslog.
>
> This patch, loosely based on grsecurity's GRKERNSEC_DMESG, creates the
> dmesg_restrict sysctl. When set to "0", the default, no restrictions
> are enforced. When set to "1", only users with CAP_SYS_ADMIN can read
> the kernel syslog via dmesg(8) or other mechanisms.
>
> v3 sets a default for the config, renames to
> CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT to be consistent with the sysctl name,
> and adds Acks.
>
The patch adds trailing whitespace. checkpatch detects it.
> CC: stable <stable@...nel.org>
hm. Reasons for this?
> ...
>
> +dmesg_restrict:
> +
> +This toggle indicates whether unprivileged users are prevented
> +from using dmesg(8) to view messages from the kernel's log
> +buffer. By default, it is set to (0), resulting in no
> +restrictions. When set to (1), users must have CAP_SYS_ADMIN
> +to use dmesg(8).
Actually, the default depends on CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT ;)
> +==============================================================
> +
> domainname & hostname:
>
> These files can be used to set the NIS/YP domainname and the
> diff --git a/include/linux/kernel.h b/include/linux/kernel.h
> index 450092c..f0d0088 100644
> --- a/include/linux/kernel.h
> +++ b/include/linux/kernel.h
> @@ -293,6 +293,7 @@ extern bool printk_timed_ratelimit(unsigned long *caller_jiffies,
> unsigned int interval_msec);
>
> extern int printk_delay_msec;
> +extern int dmesg_restrict;
>
> /*
> * Print a one-time message (analogous to WARN_ONCE() et al):
> diff --git a/kernel/printk.c b/kernel/printk.c
> index b2ebaee..38e7d58 100644
> --- a/kernel/printk.c
> +++ b/kernel/printk.c
> @@ -261,6 +261,12 @@ static inline void boot_delay_msec(void)
> }
> #endif
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
> +int dmesg_restrict = 1;
> +#else
> +int dmesg_restrict;
> +#endif
You might be able to make this an int type and do
int dmesg_restrict = CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT;
We did a trick like that with CONFIG_BASE_SMALL:
int whatever = CONFIG_BASE_SMALL ? 2 : 42;
otoh you might decide not to bother, in which case, this?
--- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt~restrict-unprivileged-access-to-kernel-syslog-fix
+++ a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
@@ -216,11 +216,14 @@ to decide what to do with it.
dmesg_restrict:
-This toggle indicates whether unprivileged users are prevented
-from using dmesg(8) to view messages from the kernel's log
-buffer. By default, it is set to (0), resulting in no
-restrictions. When set to (1), users must have CAP_SYS_ADMIN
-to use dmesg(8).
+This toggle indicates whether unprivileged users are prevented from using
+dmesg(8) to view messages from the kernel's log buffer. When
+dmesg_restrict is set to (0) there are no restrictions. When
+dmesg_restrict is set set to (1), users must have CAP_SYS_ADMIN to use
+dmesg(8).
+
+The kernel config option CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT sets the default
+value of dmesg_restrict.
==============================================================
_
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