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Date: Thu, 11 Nov 2010 08:05:48 +0100
From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
To: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>,
Marcus Meissner <meissner@...e.de>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, jason.wessel@...driver.com,
fweisbec@...il.com, tj@...nel.org, mort@....com, akpm@...l.org,
security@...nel.org, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@...llo.nl>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] kernel: make /proc/kallsyms mode 400 to reduce ease of
attacking
* H. Peter Anvin <hpa@...or.com> wrote:
> Now, *relative* symbol addresses will typically not have any randomness at all,
> which may limit the usefulness, of course.
Yeah - but it happens quite often that the scope of the vulnerability only allows
absolute addresses. In fact it's a pretty common case: basically most derefs into
attacker-controlled data pointers are like that.
Thanks,
Ingo
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