linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] Fix dmesg_restrict build failure with CONFIG_EMBEDDED=y and CONFIG

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.2.00.1011151155240.20099@tundra.namei.org>
Date:	Mon, 15 Nov 2010 12:16:33 +1100 (EST)
From:	James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
To:	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
cc:	Joe Perches <joe@...ches.com>,
	Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@...curity.com>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>,
	Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@...nel.org>,
	Kees Cook <kees.cook@...onical.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Fix dmesg_restrict build failure with CONFIG_EMBEDDED=y
 and CONFIG_PRINTK=n

On Sat, 13 Nov 2010, Linus Torvalds wrote:

[Adding the LSM list]

> CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT is supposed to be about the initial
> _value_ of dmesg_restrict, not about whether it exists or not. If you
> don't have CONFIG_SECURITY, you still end up defaulting to the common
> capability model, and it would still want that dmesg_restrict thing.
> 
> But what can make sense is to move "dmesg_restrict" into
> security/commoncap.c, and just make it about capabilities. Of course,
> that then means that if you use some other security model that just
> doesn't care about capabilities at all, they'll never care about
> dmesg_restrict either. So that, to me, smells of really bad interface
> design.

Yes, it should not be possible for an LSM to reduce the default security 
-- an interface which allows this breaks the security model.

> We had this exact problem with the whole "mmap_min_addr" thing. People
> _thought_ of it as generic, but because it was actually tested by the
> security logic, if you ended up enabling SELinux the test actually
> went away entirely (or maybe it was the other way around). So with
> certain security models, the whole thing was bypassed, and the
> security module actually became an _IN_security module.
>
> That's why I don't think we should do things like this inside the
> security models themselves. People just get really confused about what
> the real semantics are.
> 
> If something should be generic (and by all accounts, that's the
> intention of 'dmesg_restrict', the same way it was for
> 'mmap_min_addr'). Which is why I'd change the whole idiotic
> security_syslog() model itself as per the patch I just sent out.

Looks like the right approach to me.

Kees, does this patch work for you?

I want to ensure that LSMs which implement security_syslog can't end up 
with a less secure system than the default, regardless of whether they 
call cap_syslog or not.


- James
-- 
James Morris
<jmorris@...ei.org>
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/