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Message-ID: <20101117100053.GA1574@ucw.cz> Date: Wed, 17 Nov 2010 11:00:54 +0100 From: Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz> To: Kees Cook <kees.cook@...onical.com> Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org Subject: Re: [Security] proactive defense: using read-only memory Hi! > - Modules need to be correctly marked RO/NX. This patch exists[3], but is > not in mainline. It needs to be in mainline. Why not. > - Pointers to function table also need to be marked read-only after > they are set. An example of this is the security_ops table pointer. It > gets set once at boot, and never changes again. These need to be handled > so it isn't possible to just trivially reaim the entire security_ops > table lookup somewhere else. But there are too many of those. You can't block them all... > - Entry points to set_kernel_text_rw() and similar need to be blockable. > Having these symbols available make kernel memory modification trivial; What prevents attacker to just inlining those functions in the exploit? If you want protection domain inside kernel, perhaps you should take ukernel approach? -- (english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek (cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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