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Message-ID: <1290471649.2704.24.camel@edumazet-laptop>
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 2010 01:20:48 +0100
From: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@...il.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Boaz Harrosh <bharrosh@...asas.com>,
Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com>,
Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@...ger.ca>,
kernel-janitors@...r.kernel.org,
Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Jakub Jelinek <jakub@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] fs: select: fix information leak to userspace
Le lundi 22 novembre 2010 à 15:50 -0800, Andrew Morton a écrit :
> Well. We certainly assume in many places that
>
> struct foo {
> int a;
> int b;
> } f = {
> .a = 1,
> };
>
> will initialise b to zero. But I doubt if much code at all assumes
> that this initialisation patterm will reliably zero out *holes* in the
> struct.
>
We did such assertions in the past, we were wrong.
Check commit 1c40be12f7d8ca1d387510d39787b12e512a7ce8 for an example
(net sched: fix some kernel memory leaks)
I guess we must make a full audit of all C99 initializers or structures
copied to userspace, giving a name to hidden holes, to force gcc to init
them to 0.
# cat try.c
struct s {
char c;
long l;
};
void bar(void *v)
{
unsigned long *p = v;
printf("%lx %lx\n", p[0], p[1]);
}
int main()
{
struct s s1 = {
.c = 1,
.l = 2,
};
bar(&s1);
return 0;
}
# gcc -O2 -o try try.c
# ./try
8049401 2
Strangely, if we remove ".l = 2," line, gcc emits code to clear al the
fields
main:
pushl %ebp
movl %esp, %ebp
andl $-16, %esp
subl $32, %esp
leal 24(%esp), %eax
movl $0, 24(%esp)
movl %eax, (%esp)
movl $0, 28(%esp)
movb $1, 24(%esp)
call bar
xorl %eax, %eax
leave
ret
--
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