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Date: Sun, 5 Dec 2010 19:49:07 +0200
From: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>
To: akpm@...ux-foundation.org
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>
Subject: [PATCH 10/45] kstrtox: convert security/
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>
---
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 2 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c | 2 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 15 ++++-----------
security/selinux/hooks.c | 4 ++--
security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 2 +-
security/tomoyo/common.c | 8 +++++---
6 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index b7106f1..990ff86 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -754,7 +754,7 @@ module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, aabool, S_IRUSR);
static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str)
{
unsigned long enabled;
- int error = strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled);
+ int error = kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled);
if (!error)
apparmor_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
return 1;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c
index c5c5a72..b4a203c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ static int __init ima_audit_setup(char *str)
{
unsigned long audit;
- if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &audit))
+ if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &audit))
ima_audit = audit ? 1 : 0;
return 1;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index aef8c0a..7958938 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -276,7 +276,6 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry)
while ((p = strsep(&rule, " \t")) != NULL) {
substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
int token;
- unsigned long lnum;
if (result < 0)
break;
@@ -347,8 +346,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry)
break;
}
- result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 16,
- &entry->fsmagic);
+ result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &entry->fsmagic);
if (!result)
entry->flags |= IMA_FSMAGIC;
break;
@@ -360,14 +358,9 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry)
break;
}
- result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
- if (!result) {
- entry->uid = (uid_t) lnum;
- if (entry->uid != lnum)
- result = -EINVAL;
- else
- entry->flags |= IMA_UID;
- }
+ result = kstrtou32(args[0].from, 10, &entry->uid);
+ if (!result)
+ entry->flags |= IMA_UID;
break;
case Opt_obj_user:
ima_log_string(ab, "obj_user", args[0].from);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 65fa8bf..4ee09bd 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ int selinux_enforcing;
static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
{
unsigned long enforcing;
- if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
+ if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
return 1;
}
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
{
unsigned long enabled;
- if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
+ if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
return 1;
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 073fd5b..cdaf958 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE;
static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
{
unsigned long checkreqprot;
- if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot))
+ if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot))
selinux_checkreqprot = checkreqprot ? 1 : 0;
return 1;
}
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.c b/security/tomoyo/common.c
index 7556315..1096c81 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/common.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/common.c
@@ -1091,14 +1091,16 @@ static int tomoyo_write_domain_profile(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
char *data = head->write_buf;
char *cp = strchr(data, ' ');
struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain;
- unsigned long profile;
+ unsigned int profile;
+ int rv;
if (!cp)
return -EINVAL;
*cp = '\0';
domain = tomoyo_find_domain(cp + 1);
- if (strict_strtoul(data, 10, &profile))
- return -EINVAL;
+ rv = kstrtouint(data, 10, &profile);
+ if (rv < 0)
+ return rv;
if (domain && profile < TOMOYO_MAX_PROFILES
&& (tomoyo_profile_ptr[profile] || !tomoyo_policy_loaded))
domain->profile = (u8) profile;
--
1.7.2.2
--
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