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Message-ID: <1291822780.3072.40.camel@localhost.localdomain>
Date: Wed, 08 Dec 2010 10:39:40 -0500
From: Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>, dwalsh@...hat.com,
Kees Cook <kees.cook@...onical.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] syslog: check cap_syslog when dmesg_restrict
On Wed, 2010-12-08 at 15:19 +0000, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> Eric Paris pointed out that it doesn't make sense to require
> both CAP_SYS_ADMIN and CAP_SYSLOG for certain syslog actions.
> So require CAP_SYSLOG, not CAP_SYS_ADMIN, when dmesg_restrict
> is set.
>
> (I'm also consolidating the now common error path)
>
> Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...onical.com>
> ---
> Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt | 2 +-
> kernel/printk.c | 20 ++++++++++----------
> 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
> index 209e158..5740671 100644
> --- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
> @@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ dmesg_restrict:
> This toggle indicates whether unprivileged users are prevented from using
> dmesg(8) to view messages from the kernel's log buffer. When
> dmesg_restrict is set to (0) there are no restrictions. When
> -dmesg_restrict is set set to (1), users must have CAP_SYS_ADMIN to use
> +dmesg_restrict is set set to (1), users must have CAP_SYSLOG to use
> dmesg(8).
>
> The kernel config option CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT sets the default
> diff --git a/kernel/printk.c b/kernel/printk.c
> index 0712380..0cecba0 100644
> --- a/kernel/printk.c
> +++ b/kernel/printk.c
> @@ -279,18 +279,12 @@ int do_syslog(int type, char __user *buf, int len, bool from_file)
> * at open time.
> */
> if (type == SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN || !from_file) {
> - if (dmesg_restrict && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> - return -EPERM;
> + if (dmesg_restrict && !capable(CAP_SYSLOG))
> + goto warn; /* switch to return -EPERM after 2.6.39 */
> if ((type != SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL &&
> type != SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER) &&
> - !capable(CAP_SYSLOG)) {
> - /* remove after 2.6.38 */
> - if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> - WARN_ONCE(1, "Attempt to access syslog with "
> - "CAP_SYS_ADMIN but no CAP_SYSLOG "
> - "(deprecated and denied).\n");
> - return -EPERM;
> - }
> + !capable(CAP_SYSLOG))
> + goto warn; /* switch to return -EPERM after 2.6.39 */
Doesn't this return -EPERM right now? I think the code might be
incorrect today as well......
I thought the flow was supposed to be
if (capable(CAP_SYSLOG))
all good
else if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
WARN, but still good for now
else
EPERM
But it looks to me like the flow is
if (capable(CAP_SYSLOG))
all good
else if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
WARN, EPERM
else
EPERM
> }
>
> error = security_syslog(type);
> @@ -434,6 +428,12 @@ int do_syslog(int type, char __user *buf, int len, bool from_file)
> }
> out:
> return error;
> +warn:
> + /* remove after 2.6.39 */
> + if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> + WARN_ONCE(1, "Attempt to access syslog with CAP_SYS_ADMIN "
> + "but no CAP_SYSLOG (deprecated and denied).\n");
> + return -EPERM;
> }
>
> SYSCALL_DEFINE3(syslog, int, type, char __user *, buf, int, len)
--
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